

THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY



The Pro and Con Monthly

June - July, 1930

Brief History of the London Conference

Provisions of the Treaty Explained

The French-Italian Controversy

Pro and Con Discussion

Should the London Treaty be Ratified?

Regular Departments



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The Congressional Digest

The Pro and Con Monthly

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The Congressional Digest

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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

THE PRO AND CON FEATURE

ACTION BY HOUSE AND SENATE

Should the London Treaty be Ratified?

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The Treaty Explained
The French-Italian Controversy

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The Treaty and World Peace
Pro and Con Discussion

President Hoover Transmits Naval Treaty to Senate



ARTICLE III, Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States provides that:

"He (the President) shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur."

On May 1, 1930, President Hoover forwarded the London Naval Treaty to the Senate with the following brief message:

"I transmit herewith a treaty for the limitation and reduction of naval armament, signed at London on April 22, 1930, by the plenipotentiaries of the President of the United States of America; the President of the French Republic; His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions Beyond the Seas, Emporer of India; His Majesty the King of Italy; and His Majesty the Emporer of Japan, to the ratification of which I ask

the advice and consent of the Senate."

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to which the Treaty was referred, held open hearings on it from May 12 to May 28, inclusive. The Senate Committee on Naval Affairs also held hearings on the Treaty from May 14 to May 29 inclusive. On May 23 the Treaty was reported to the Senate, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, the vote on reporting it being 16 to 4.

President Hoover has announced his intention to call the Senate into extraordinary session, after the adjournment of the current regular session of Congress, for the consideration of the Treaty but as the DIGEST goes to press the date of the extra session has not been announced.

Details of the negotiations leading up to the signing of the Treaty and a discussion of its provisions will be found on succeeding pages.

Chronology of the London Conference

January 21 to April 22, 1930

On January 21—The London Naval Conference met for its first plenary session in the Royal Gallery of the House of Lords. At this meeting the heads of the five delegations delivered preliminary addresses.

On January 23—The second plenary session was held at St. James' Palace. Each delegation stated its general views and a general committee was formed known as the First Committee.

On January 24—Private conversations were begun for the purpose of working out an agenda. These conversations continued until January 29.

On January 28—Mr. Stimson delivered his first radio address, which was broadcast to America.

On January 30—The third plenary session was held at St. James' Palace at which a plan to appoint a committee to examine methods and procedure was discussed. It was decided that the committee appointed on January 23, which included all the delegates, was competent to do this work.

On motion of Mr. Stimson the French transactional proposal and the British proposal for limitation by categories were taken up by the Committee. Speech delivered by Mr. Gibson.

On January 31—The French delegation issued a revised text of its transactional proposal.

On February 1—The delegates began private consideration on the French proposal.

On February 2—Mr. Robinson delivered an address broadcast to America.

On February 6—Mr. Stimson issued a formal statement of America's position, outlining terms of an agreement with Great Britain and Japan.

On February 7—A British memorandum was published outlining the policy of the British Government at the conference.

On February 11—The Fourth Plenary Session was held at St. James' Palace for the discussion of submarines. Two resolutions were referred to the First Committee for report: (1)—By the American delegation for the appointment of a committee to consider the abolition of the submarine or its regulation to conform to the rules governing surface ships; (2)—By the French delegation, requesting the appointment of a committee to prepare an agreement binding submarines to observe the rules of war governing surface vessels. Speech by Mr. Stimson.

In a press statement Mr. Stimson declared that to restrict the use of the submarine was alone "worth the visit of the American delegation to London."

On February 12—The First Committee met at St. James' Palace, received a report from the Committee of Experts containing proposals for reconciling alternative methods of limitation and sent the report to the heads of delegations. The two resolutions on submarines were sent to the Committee of Experts.

On February 13—M. Tardieu issued a memorandum setting forth the French position and outlining a naval

program for a fleet of 724,000 tons by 1936, which program, he stated, might become relative if guarantees of security could be found.

Japanese delegation issued a statement of its position covering all categories of ships but refrained from mentioning a ration to the navies of the other nations.

The Committee of Experts began a study of special vessels outside the principal categories and vessels exempt from limitations.

On February 14—An intensive study of tons and guns was begun at a meeting at St. James' Palace of Messrs. MacDonald, Henderson and Alexander, Great Britain; Mm. Tardieu and Briand, France, and Messrs. Stimson, Morrow and Robinson, America. The question of security for France was discussed.

On February 16—Mr. Reed delivered an address which was broadcast to America.

On February 17—The Tardieu Cabinet was defeated in Paris and the French delegation to the Conference was recalled.

At a private luncheon to American newspaper correspondents, Mr. Stimson recalled that during the Russian-Chinese crisis in the Autumn of 1929, it was felt at Washington that additional machinery was needed to supplement the Outlawry of War treaties and to permit prompt consultation in future crises. The press interpreted this to mean that Mr. Stimson was not opposed to the principle of consultation.

On February 19—The Conference adjourned for a week due to the French political situation. The Committee of Experts continued its technical studies.

Speech by Mr. Robinson at luncheon of London Association of American correspondents.

Signor Grandi issued a statement of Italian policy, repeating the Italian offer to reduce to any level, however low, provided that level is not exceeded by any other Continental power.

On February 25—In Paris, the Chautemps Government was defeated on the first vote of confidence, prolonging the French political crisis.

On February 26—The heads of the delegation met with the French Ambassador at London and arranged to resume full activities upon the return of the French delegation and in the meantime to continue informal conversations.

On February 27—A spokesman for the British delegation denied that an agreement by Great Britain, America and Japan was being negotiated in the absence of the French.

On March 2—Mr. Adams delivered an address which was broadcast to America.

On March 3—The American delegation received a cablegram signed by 1200 private American citizens urging reduction in tonnage and favoring a consultative pact with France.

On March 5—Mr. Stimson issued a press statement estimating that net reduction of tonnage, as estimated, will give the American navy about 200,000 tons. These figures were given in answer to reports from America that the outcome of the Conference would result in an increase and not a decrease in American tonnage.

In Paris the Tardieu Government received a vote of confidence in the Chamber of Deputies.

On March 6—Mr. Alexander presented to Parliament estimates for the British Navy for 1930-31, calling for a reduction of nearly \$20,000,000.

Mr. Stimson, in a press statement announcing that the American Navy would be reduced by about 200,000 tons under the pending treaty.

On March 7—The French delegation returned headed by M. Briand, and the work of the Conference was resumed.

On March 8—So called "political conversations" were begun at Stammore, the country house occupied by Mr. Stimson, participated in by Mr. Stimson, M. Briand, Mr. Morrow and Mr. Henderson.

On March 9—Political conversations were continued at Chequers, country home of the British Prime Minister, Mr. MacDonald, Mr. Henderson and M. Briand participating.

On March 10—With the political conversations ended for the time being a detailed examination of the French naval program was begun by Mr. Alexander, Great Britain, and M. Dumesnil, France, with Mr. Morrow, America, assisting as a disinterested consultant.

On March 11—Mr. Stimson at a tea to American correspondents, stated unequivocally that America cannot enter into any consultative pact as a return for a reduction of the French naval program.

On March 12—M. Tardieu left for Paris for several days and negotiations were suspended pending his return.

On March 16—Mr. MacDonald, M. Tardieu and M. Briand conferred at Chequers and the French delegation announced that efforts to reach an agreement would continue.

On March 17—M. Tardieu returned to Paris to attend to domestic affairs.

On March 19—M. Briand returned to Paris.

On March 20—Mr. MacDonald and Signor Grandi conferred at the House of Commons regarding the Italian position.

On March 21—Mr. MacDonald requested an audience with King George.

Spokesmen for the British delegation stated that a way out of the deadlock had not been discovered.

March 22—Signor Grandi proposed to Mr. MacDonald that five power conference adjourn for six months, during which time France and Italy would attempt to settle their differences with good offices of Great Britain, leaving Great Britain, America, and Japan free to sign a three power agreement at once.

Lord Tyrrell, British Ambassador, in Paris, called on M. Briand to urge him to return to London as soon as possible.

March 25—Mr. Stimson, in a press statement, declared the American delegation would consider the matter of a consultation pact with an open mind, if the French demand for security could not be satisfied in some other way.

March 26—M. Briand departed for London to renew efforts to achieve a five power pact.

March 27—Heads of delegations, in meeting at St. James' Palace announced decision to hold Plenary session April 4.

March 28—M. Briand and Mr. Henderson with assistance of Foreign Office experts discussed ways in which British obligations under League Covenant and Locarno pact might be clarified, and reinterpreted so as to remove existing doubts and permit reduction in French program.

April 1—Japanese delegation received approval of Tokio Government to Reed-Matsudaira agreement, subject only to minor reservations.

April 2—Plenary session set for April 4, postponed indefinitely to permit Anglo-French security negotiations to continue.

On April 3—Mr. Reed issued a press statement praising the spirit shown by the British and Japanese delegations.

April 5—M. Briand returned to Paris with new security formula to submit for approval of Government.

On April 6—Mr. Gibson broadcast an address to America.

April 7—Signor Grandi conferred with Mr. MacDonald, revealing no change in Italian policy.

April 8—M. Briand, back from Paris, conferred with Mr. MacDonald on position of five power conference. French cabinet, while approving security formula, reported unable to reduce tonnage drastically until Italian claim to parity is abandoned.

April 10—Mr. MacDonald formally announced in House of Commons that complete three power agreement had been reached.

April 11—Drafting committee began work to complete text of treaty for signing at Plenary session.

April 22—Final Plenary Session, St. James' Place Treaty of London signed.

The American Delegates to the London Conference

Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of State, Chairman;

Charles G. Dawes, Ambassador to the Court of St. James; Charles Francis Adams, Secretary of the Navy; Joseph T. Robinson, Senator from the State of Arkansas;

David A. Reed, Senator from the State of Pennsylvania; Hugh Gibson, Ambassador to Belgium; Dwight W. Morrow, Ambassador to Mexico.

The London Naval Treaty Explained

A Summary of Its Provisions

by Hon. Joseph T. Robinson

U. S. Senator, Arkansas, Democrat, Member of the American Delegation to the London Conference



N summarizing the work of the London Naval Conference and the provisions of the treaty which resulted, I shall make no effort to speak from a technical viewpoint. The desire is to present in condensed form the principal features of the arrangement entered into with regard to the programs of the three chief naval powers.

Objectives of the American Delegation

The prime objectives of our delegation have been:

1. To cooperate with other delegations in terminating naval competition by limiting all classes of warships;
2. To assure equality of naval strength for the United States with Great Britain;
3. To arrange a satisfactory relation between our Navy and that of the Japanese;
4. To bring about reductions in tonnage wherever practicable.

Let us consider the degree to which these objectives have been attained.

Partial Failure of Five-power Plan

It is clear that as a five-power enterprise there is not complete success. The importance of this is not to be minimized. Unquestionably it would have been more satisfactory to have a treaty defining the programs of France and Italy as well as those of Great Britain, the United States, and Japan. The Italians insisted on parity with the navy of the strongest continental power, even though there is little likelihood that Italy would actually build up to French tonnage during the period of the treaty. The French refused this demand. France is carrying forward a naval construction program materially increasing her tonnage in cruisers, submarine boats, and destroyers. She was not disposed to reduce these tonnages without new guarantees of security.

Failure to Incorporate Sanctions

The various methods of creating new guarantees of security were amply discussed in the press while the negotiations were in progress. No delegation asked the United States to participate in any security pact. The American Delegation made it plain that the United States would not join any consultative pact which could by implication be regarded as giving security. The French said that a mere consultative pact would not take one ton off their navy. The French and British tried to restate their security obligations as a basis for a reduction in French tonnage. This effort had to be linked with a settlement between France and Italy. It was the realization that this double settlement would have to be postponed that led to the conclusion of the conference on the

present basis, and the insertion of a contingent clause to which further reference will be made.

We took the position that fair limitation of armament is of itself a wholesome and effective measure of security, tending to promote international good will and pacific measures for adjustment of disputes. Where treaty relations are threatened or disturbed, consultation is a logical and probably inevitable process; but agreements for consultation, unless carefully safeguarded, entered into in advance, in the opinion of many, tend to the formation of alliances and to the assumption of responsibility for decisions which might result in involvements which our people desire to avoid.

Restrictions of Submarines

Efforts to negotiate a five-power arrangement were continued—perhaps they were unduly prolonged—finally resulting in a postponement of conclusions between the European powers and participation by France and Italy in the provisions of the treaty except those relating to the limitation of tonnages the provisions in which all five powers join. These while less comprehensive than those entered into by the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, include the battleship holiday and the restriction on the use of submarines against merchant ships in time of war, which in themselves are achievements of magnitude and value.

With respect to the above-mentioned restriction on the use of submarines, the five powers accept as rules of international law: (1) that submarines in action with regard to merchant ships must conform to the rules applicable to surface vessels; (2) more definitely stated, save in case of persistent refusal to stop when duly summoned or of active resistance to visit or search, neither surface craft nor submarine may sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant ship, without first safeguarding the passengers, crew, and ship's papers. It is further declared that placing passengers, crew, and ship's papers in the ship's boats is not a compliance with this rule unless safety is assured by sea and weather conditions, proximity to land, or the presence of another vessel to take them on board. The acceptance of these rules as international law may not prevent all abuses of the character denounced. Undoubtedly, in time of war belligerents will be tempted to violate them. However great such temptations may prove, parties to future conflicts will be slow to challenge the resentment of mankind by ruthless destruction of merchant vessels, for such a course would invite results disastrous to the offender.

The National Security Clause

The limitations agreed to by the three powers are accompanied by a contingent clause which provides that if any one of the three feels its national security jeopardized

by new naval construction of any power whose auxiliary fleet has not been limited, it may notify the others what increase it requires. The others may then make proportionate increases. This is in no sense a sanction, neither does it provide for consultation.

Of course it may be said in criticism that this clause permits a disturbance of the figures agreed to on the sole responsibility of either the United States, Great Britain, or Japan; and that if any one of the three adjudges it to be necessary to build in excess of the treaty program, this will increase the building of the other two. But even if this should happen, the relation of the fleets and the principles of limitation would still be maintained. It should also be remembered that the limitation of armaments must proceed only through the voluntary action of nations and that no power can arbitrarily impose on another restrictions of the means of defense without assuming more responsibility for its safety. It is of first importance that the limitation of armaments shall be regarded as increasing rather than diminishing the safety of peoples, and if emergencies, regarded as remote but nevertheless as possible, arise threatening immediate danger, a people should be free to respond to the requirements of their situation. Otherwise the fate of nations must forever be bound up with the maintenance of large armaments and the imminence of war. This clause is based upon the good faith of the three nations and it is inconceivable that it will be used except upon necessity. It leaves the responsibility of determining the requirements for national security where it belongs; namely, on the respective nations. A clause providing for consultation or mutual agreement might imply some measure of obligation of all who enter into it. Failure to bind ourselves to consult or mediate in no way impairs the right of the United States to consult and give advice and even tender good offices should the occasion justify, but we should be left free to act as the friend of both parties to a dispute or at least as impartial in all controversies which do not involve American rights or interest.

Prominent Features of Three-Power Agreement.

This treaty vitally affects the relations of the Navies of Great Britain, Japan, and the United States in every category of war vessels.

Battleships

The treaty contemplates two important changes to the Washington treaty adjustment regarding capital ships. Under the plan now in force, prior to December 31, 1936, the United States would lay down 10, Great Britain 10, and Japan 6 new capital ships. Under the proposed London treaty no new ship of this class will be laid down.

In addition to the holiday the three powers will commence to scrap in this class prior to December 31, 1931: Great Britain 5, United States 3, Japan 1.

Thus substantial parity between the United States and Great Britain will result following the close of 1931. Postponement of construction of the 10 ships referred to will probably contribute to a final permanent reduction in this category. It will certainly defer the expenditure by the United States of at least \$300,000,000 during the life of the treaty. The early scrapping agreed upon likewise will result in avoiding expenditure which otherwise would be required for repair, maintenance, and operation.

Our experts are of the unanimous opinion that these amendments to the battleship program will bring about actual parity between the United States and Great Britain in capital ships.

Eight-inch Cruisers

In the large cruiser class, carrying 8-inch guns, the United States will have 18 ships with a tonnage of 180,000; Great Britain will have 15 ships aggregating in tonnage 148,000; and Japan 12 ships totaling 108,400 tons. The United States desired a considerable number of vessels having a long-cruising radius; while Great Britain found a comparatively large number of the small type better adapted to her purposes. The superiority afforded the United States in these large cruisers constituted recognition to some extent of the difference in type of cruisers required for her purposes as compared with the British needs. Prolonged investigation of the subject led to the conclusion that no scientific basis exists for measuring the difference in value between large 8-inch-gun cruisers and vessels carrying 6-inch guns. To offset the American advantage of 33,200 tons in 8-inch-gun cruisers Great Britain has the right to employ in 6-inch-gun cruisers 48,700 tons more than the United States, making a net difference in the cruiser tonnage of the two powers of 15,500 in favor of Great Britain in cruisers of all classes.

It is not possible to say that this difference corresponds with mathematical accuracy to the superior value of the large cruisers which the United States has the right to possess over those allowed Great Britain.

Within certain ranges 6-inch guns are more effective than 8-inch guns. At great distances, however, the advantage clearly is in the ship carrying guns with the longest range. On the other hand the smaller guns can be fired more rapidly and perhaps more accurately than the heavy 8-inch weapons. There can be no important advantage to either of the two powers because of this difference in 8-inch cruiser tonnage.

Moreover, it may be emphasized that the United States has the option to build exactly Great Britain's program and thereby produce a ton for ton parity between the two countries.

Destroyers

In the destroyer category very material reductions are made. The United States now has a tonnage considerably in excess of 200,000, but many of the ships are old and nothing like the present number is required. Great Britain and the United States will each have 150,000 tons in destroyers. The present Japanese Fleet of 6-inch gun cruisers is 98,415 tons. The treaty gives Japan 100,450 tons. The present Japanese destroyer fleet is 129,375 tons. In these two categories Japan will have 70 per cent of our fleet and 17,000 tons less than the present.

Submarines

Finally, each of the three powers may have 52,700 tons in submarines. In the conference the United States and Great Britain sought to abolish warships of this class, but other powers were unwilling to do so and limitation was resorted to at a relatively low tonnage.

The United States at the time of the conference was inferior in submarine tonnage to both Great Britain and Japan. Our inferiority in this class, as in the cruiser category, is attributable to our failure to build following the Washington Conference. From the ratification of the Washington treaty until now the United States has neglected building not only in those classes in which a war surplus remained, but also in cruisers in which our Navy was deficient.

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The Controversy Between France and Italy

The Cause of Their Difference—What Prevented the Two Continental Powers from Signing A Five-Power Naval Pact

by Raymond Gram Swing

London Correspondent, *New York Evening Post*



HE London Treaty was incomplete. The next step will be to complete it, that is, to limit the navies of France and Italy.

It may help to understand what this entails if we review for a moment a few difficulties of the London Conference. Let us start by considering the fact that in a country called Tunis on the south shore of the Mediterranean are 160,000 human beings whose relationship to each other had a surprising influence on the fate of the treaty. It never occurred to me until the Naval Conference was held that the relations of 160,000 persons in Tunis could even remotely have anything to do with the size of the American navy. But it happens that 89,000 of these persons are Italians and 71,000 are French. It also happens that Tunis is a French Protectorate. The French dislike being outnumbered by citizens of Italy in their own protectorate. The French are doing everything in their power to make them citizens of France.

The Convention of 1896

The Italians in Tunis do most of the small farming, commerce and mining. The French own most of the large estates. The Italians are in Tunis to stay. The French population is partly transient and the Italians have more babies.

A convention in 1896 gave the Italians and their dependents the right to keep their citizenship. Nine years ago, France denounced this convention and later issued a decree which automatically makes French citizens of all children born in Tunis of a parent who likewise was born in Tunis. This decree would make Frenchmen of Italian children. This decree has not actually been put into effect against Italians but the provisions of the convention of 1896 have only been kept in force by renewal, for the past nine years, for periods of three months. At any moment the French may refuse to renew it, and from that moment the Italian colony at Tunis will start its slow change into a French one.

The naval treaty contains the maximum figures of the American, British and Japanese navies, and then it contains a provision that any one of the three powers may build above its figure if it feels its security threatened by the building of some power whose navy has not been limited. That is the famous escape clause.

The French-Italian Naval Problem

If France and Italy go to building against each other and between them threaten Britain's position in the Mediterranean; Britain will build above the treaty figures, and then America would have to build up to Britain or abandon parity.

It became clear at London that France was willing to limit her building, but on France's terms, and one of them was that Italy accept the existing ratio of naval strength

between them. But Italy claimed the right to lay down new ships, ton for ton, with France. "If you do that," said the French, "We will outbuild you to keep the existing ratio." And so it will go on unless the political questions are settled which are the motive of this naval competition. And so it is that the kind of passports and education that 89,000 Italians in Tunis are to have becomes of moment to the whole world.

The Libian Hinterland

This is not the only political question to be settled between France and Italy. Another is the possession of the hinterland of Libia. Libia is Italy's north coast African colony. Part of it stretches along the Mediterranean, and that part is worth having, as colonies go, but it also stretches backward across the Sahara Desert. It has been in dispute ever since Italy took it over on defeating Turkey in 1911. To the south of this region, the territory belongs to France, and France, too, claims and has occupied territory north of the lake. Once the lake promised to be the key to Africa's internal empire, but the projection of a railroad across the Sahara Desert has reduced its importance. North of the lake is desert, dotted here and there by a few oases. Most of it is worth very little, but Italy demands it. She would like the lake as well, but probably would be satisfied by cession of the disputed territory to the north.

Italy has other demands. One is to the French port of Jibuti just across the Persian Gulf from the southern tip of Arabia. Italy, too, would like France to recognize her preponderance in the Balkans. But these two claims Italy is ready to defer if she can be satisfied on the question of citizenship in Tunis and the southern frontier of Libia; then she will sign treaties of arbitration and amity with France and the two might limit their navies.

French and Italian Negotiations

Now, these were two of the three political problems which gave trouble at the London Conference. Now they are to become the subject of direct negotiations between the French and Italian governments. France, you will see, has nothing to gain and something to lose. Italy has nothing to lose and something to gain. That means that in the negotiations the room for bargaining is small. For both sides much prestige is at stake.

Briand has been eager to reach agreement with Italy for years, whereas Italy, because of these two problems, has put off signing the proposed treaty. At London we got the impression that now Grandi himself wished the personal success of making peace with France, but that both he and Briand wanted it done at some other time and place, not as though Britain and America had forced them, like quarreling schoolboys, to do it in London. Mussolini may be waiting to come to terms with France

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Should the London Treaty be Ratified?

Pro

HON. HENRY L. STIMSON
U. S. Secretary of State.

 OR over a year the work of the State Department of the United States has been very largely directed towards carrying out the movement initiated by President Hoover looking toward a treaty of general naval limitation. This movement has just culminated in the London Naval Treaty of 1930, and that treaty is now pending before the governments of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy for ratification.

The situation as it stood a year ago may be summed up as follows. The nations of the world had been taking definite practical steps towards a new regime of peace by the partial naval disarmament of the Washington Treaty of 1922. They had also entered into a formal covenant to renounce war altogether as a national policy. But the practical steps of disarmament were incomplete and new suspicions and irritations were growing up in consequence. And the Briand-Kellogg Peace Pact was thus far a mere paper promise. Its fate was trembling in the balance. Whether this paper was to become a live system and thus to mark the opening of a really new era in the world's progress or whether like many other good resolutions it should fade away into nothingness, depended on the practical steps which should be taken to make it good.

From this background the Government of the United States under President Hoover and that of Great Britain under Prime Minister MacDonald started last year the movement to change the old dangerous conditions, to complete the work begun by the Washington Conference, to close the last possibility of naval competition between their own peoples and the other peoples of the world, and thus to take a long step forward towards making effective the noble intentions of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Negotiations between the two governments were begun in the Summer of 1929. They were carried on at the personal conference of Mr. Hoover and Mr. MacDonald at the Rapidan in October. Their purposes were set forth in the following joint statement issued by them on October 9th after this personal meeting:

"We have been guided by the double hope of settling our own differences on naval matters and so establishing unclouded good will, candor and confidence between us, and also of contributing something to the solution of the problem of peace in which all other nations are interested and which calls for their cooperation.

"In signing the Paris Peace Pact fifty-six nations have declared that war shall not be used as an instrument of national policy. We have agreed that all disputes shall be settled by pacific means.

"Both our governments resolve to accept the Peace Pact not as a declaration of good intentions, but as a positive obligation to direct national policy in accordance with its pledge."

Out of these beginnings came the call for the London Conference and out of the London Conference came the

Continued on next page

Con

HON. HIRAM W. JOHNSON,
U. S. Senator, California, Republican



T is neither as an opponent of disarmament nor as a big Navy man that I am against the London treaty. It is as an American with the due regard of the average American for national security and defense, but with the ever-present hope that the nations of the world will limit and reduce armaments; it is as a Californian, born there and living a long life only there, with eyes upon the broad Pacific and a firm belief that the Pacific ultimately will be the theater of world activity; it is as one grown old in public service, to whom the safeguarding of the Nation's future is far more important than an immediate petty political triumph, that I take issue upon an instrument utterly lacking in the consummation of its high-sounding purposes, and in its terms unfair and unjust to the United States.

The great preponderance of testimony demonstrates to any disinterested person:

1. That the treaty carries with it no economy and does not reduce the burden of taxation of our people.
2. That if we act under it, we immediately enter upon a building program that belies any cessation of competition, and what is worse, if the unsettled condition in Europe continues and the "escalator" clause is invoked none can foresee the end of naval building.
3. That we are not given parity with Great Britain. Even in battleships, with the scrapping of five by Great Britain and three by us, the Rodney and Nelson and their battle cruisers give Britain a marked superiority. And here is the complete refutation of the statement recently made that we obtain parity of our battleship fleet almost at once. According to authoritative testimony, the fact that we fail to build new battleships will make it necessary to modernize all of our old battleships, if we are to approach parity with Great Britain. The present disparity is primarily due to the fact that Great Britain since the Washington conference has built the two ultra-modern battleships, the Rodney and Nelson. The modernization of our old battleships will cost approximately \$118,000,000. For this great sum we could have nearly built three new battleships, instead of sinking vast expenditures into modernizing old ships which will not last as long and can never be as efficient as new ones would be. In contrast with this method of modernization, the British and Japanese, by a special provision of the treaty, hasten the scrapping and replacement of many of their old cruisers, and to them this appears to be the more sensible way of modernizing their navies. In the long run it certainly is the more economical way. And do not forget that recognizing our inferiority and our lack of parity, our representatives at London asked the right to construct a new superdreadnaught like the Rodney or Nelson, and of course, their request was immediately denied.

As has been pointed out the destroyer and submarine programs of the treaty are unfair to us because of the

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HON. HENRY L. STIMSON—Continued

London Naval Treaty. Thus that treaty is not merely an attempt to establish a relationship for the time being between the three fleets of America, Britain and Japan; it is the culmination of a ten-year movement towards peace between the various naval powers of the world and also a step in the vitalization of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Of course it is not equal to the vision of the two men who issued the Rapidan statement. In human affairs no realization ever matches the vision, and limitation of arms is not a single step but a continuous process. But the treaty is a long step forward in that evolutionary process. It prescribes a complete limitation and a cessation of competitive building between the navies of America, Britain and Japan—the three greatest naval powers of the world. Between them if this treaty is ratified there is to be no further naval competition or the rivalry, suspicion and ill-will which is sure to arise out of it. With these three powers two other powers—France and Italy—have joined in certain important agreements in the Treaty. They have joined in a six-year extension of the battleship holiday. They have also joined in a covenant to outlaw ruthless submarine warfare—the kind of warfare which dragged America into the Great War. And finally they have given to the limitation treaty of the other three powers their approval with hearty concurrence, with the promise to continue their own negotiations in the hope of ultimately joining the other three in a similarly complete limitation.

This limitation treaty is now pending for final ratification in each of the three countries to which its full restrictions will apply—America, Britain and Japan. In each of these countries it is exciting vigorous opposition in certain quarters. But the source of this opposition and the arguments which are made against it give fresh evidence of its true value and of the real basis upon which it stands. In each country the opposition comes mainly from some extremists among the professional warriors of that country, while at the same time in each country civilian public opinion is giving it overwhelming support. Furthermore, the things which are said in criticism of the treaty by warriors in one country are directly in conflict with the things which are said in criticism of it by warriors in the other countries. American admirals are saying that the treaty will not establish parity between America and Britain but will make the American navy inferior to the British navy. At the very same moment British admirals and ex-lords of the admiralty are declaring that the treaty imposes naval inferiority upon Great Britain and supremacy upon the United States. American admirals are declaring that the treaty makes impossible a successful war with Japan, while at the same moment Japanese admirals declare that the treaty makes it impossible for the Japanese navy "adequately to protect the Japanese nation." In Japan one unfortunate naval officer is even reported to have committed suicide as a protest against the treaty, and two others have recently resigned for the same reason.

The opponents of the Treaty are now urging that its consideration should be postponed until next autumn after the elections. They say that more time is required for its proper consideration by the Senate. Probably no treaty has ever been before the Senate of which the essential questions involved have had such long and

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HON. HIRAM W. JOHNSON—Continued

very substantial superiority we had in these classes when we went into the London Conference, and which we yielded without commensurate return.

4. The ratio of 5-3 with Japan accorded by the Washington Conference is substantially increased in favor of Japan, to our disadvantage and the peril of our sea-borne commerce.

5. We cannot with the cruiser strength given us by Great Britain adequately protect our commerce. Great Britain with her bases and merchant marine with the allotted eight and six inch gun cruisers can thoroughly well protect hers; but our lack of both bases and merchant marine, and the refusal to us of the larger gun cruiser, deny us exactly what Great Britain has, with meticulous care, preserved for herself.

6. Our time-honored naval policy, by which the primary duty of our Navy is to protect our commerce, is abandoned in favor of designing our Navy for fleet combat strength alone.

7. The important cruiser part of the United States Navy must be built not as the United States requires, but according to British specifications.

The Secretary of State suggests the "warriors" of all nations are attacking the treaty and he refers to a hazy press dispatch that some unfortunate officer in Japan committed suicide because of it. As an argument this is scarcely worthy a Secretary of State. The Japanese are a clever and patriotic people. It may well be that observing the ease with which their representatives obtained exactly what they wished, some Japanese may resent that they didn't ask more and, by mere insisting, obtain greater concessions. But from the standpoint of those who in the Congress oppose this treaty, the question is neither British nor Japanese. It is American.

Here is a document which its sponsors dare not permit our people to discuss; a treaty, the papers and communications relating to which they refuse not only to the people, but to the Senate as part of the treaty-making power; a pact so difficult and complex that few have any adequate understanding of it, and one which requires detailed and prolonged study; an international agreement which when first carefully scrutinized at home after execution abroad, demanded an exchange of notes with Great Britain and Japan to clarify and explain one of its most important provisions.

Whatever incense may be burned at the altar of internationalism; whatever hosannahs of praise may be sung to peace and good-will; whatever greetings may be made to power that demands at all hazards a treaty as a demonstration of achievement and accomplishment, this document that is sought to be crammed down the throats of the American people has within it not only the germs of future misunderstanding and ill-will; but above and beyond all this, it is unjust and unfair to our country. It robs us of that which we thought by sacrifices we had obtained in 1922; it may imperil our marvelously growing commerce, now equaling that of any nation on earth, and endanger even our national defense, and after all the boastful utterances concerning parity, it yields us only inferiority. It does not measure up to our material necessities and it falls far short of our ideals. It is a treaty that is un-American, and Americans should reject it.

—Extracts, see 4, p. 192.

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HON. HENRY L. STIMSON—Continued

thorough publicity as those of this Treaty. For the issues of this Treaty which are in controversy are very narrow and they have been publicly debated for over three years. The comparative values of the six and eight-inch cruisers as well as the tonnage of each which may be required by the three powers were the chief questions discussed at the Geneva Conference in 1927. Those questions have been well-known by the public ever since.

The London Naval Treaty represents a definite constructive step on the long road towards international good understanding and peace. Its ratification will ensure that step. Its defeat would undo the progress of many years. Unless we wish to reverse the well-matured policy of this country for nearly ten years, the Treaty should be ratified and ratified promptly.—*Extracts, see 3, p. 192.*

HON. CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS

U. S. Secretary of the Navy.

HE treaty as adopted at the London conference was unanimously agreed to by all the delegates representing the United States. The prime objectives of our delegation have been:

1. To cooperate with other delegations in terminating naval competition by limiting all classes of warships.
2. To assure equality of combatant naval strength for the United States with Great Britain.
3. To arrange a satisfactory relation between our Navy and that of the Japanese.
4. To bring about reductions in tonnage wherever practicable.

I signed the treaty because I think it represented the largest practicable measure of progress which could be obtained by agreement with other nations and I think it achieves our prime objectives. As Secretary of the Navy I am clear that the treaty is advantageous to the Navy of the United States.

Parity with Great Britain and an assured relation with Japan during the treaty period are of great importance to the Navy not only because the parity thus obtained checks the race in armament and ends the jealousies, but because they have an especial importance at this time to the United States Navy. The United States Navy has done very little naval construction since the Washington treaty in 1922—I think far too little. Since 1922 the United States has not laid down a battleship nor an airplane carrier. Since that date the United States has actually completed and put into commission 12 cruisers and that is all we have that are less than 20 years old. There are 16 others wholly or partly appropriated for and some of these are in process of construction. We have built no destroyers and only one submarine that had not been begun before the Washington treaty. This is probably the smallest amount of building of any first-class navy on record for an 8-year period. Even considering that we had left over from the war an adequate fleet of battleships and destroyers so small a building program is extraordinary.

Now by the terms of the treaty Great Britain and Japan, which have thus gone far ahead of us in building, particularly in cruisers, must check their building and

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HON. FREDERICK HALE
U. S. Senator, Maine, Republican.

S far back as July, 1929, when the suspension of the building of certain ships provided for under the 15-cruiser bill was indicated by the President, I made a statement, which was generally printed in the press of the country, that any changes in the 15-cruiser program as authorized by Congress would involve full hearings by the Committee on Naval Affairs of the Senate. The effect of the London treaty is materially to change this program.

On April 18, 1930, I made the following statement on the floor of the Senate:

Mr. President, section 7 of Article I of the Constitution provides that the Congress shall have power to provide and maintain a Navy, also to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into effect the foregoing power.

Under section 2 of Article II of the Constitution the President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy of the United States. He has no power over the provision and maintenance of the Navy other than the right of veto of any legislation pertaining thereto and the right to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; and, the further right, under section 3 of Article II of the Constitution, from time to time to give to the Congress information on the State of the Union and to recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.

On the Congress rests the full responsibility of determining the strength and make-up of the American Navy, except in so far as limited by treaty agreements which must themselves be ratified by a two-third vote in the Senate.

In the case of the London treaty, which it is to be assumed will soon be presented to the Senate, the President was especially requested by the cruiser act of February 13, 1929, to encourage an international agreement for the further limitation of armament.

Under this request by Congress the President has quite properly sought to negotiate a treaty providing for the further limitation of armament. The actual text of the treaty has not yet been presented to the Senate, and will not, I assume, be so presented to us until the treaty has been actually negotiated and brought back to this country.

A good deal of information has been given out about the terms of the treaty, but until the text is actually before us it is manifestly impossible for us to determine its merits or demerits.

From the reports that have already come to us it is evident that the general policy of Congress in relation to cruisers as evidenced by all cruiser legislation that Congress has enacted since the date of the signing of the Washington treaty in 1922, to build nothing but the 8-inch gun cruisers that our needs require has been set aside.

This policy of the Congress was insisted upon by the last administration at the Geneva conference, and has been supported until very recently by practically all responsible naval opinion. If it is to be set aside, the advisability of so doing must be demonstrated.

This question and other naval questions involved in the treaty are very technical in their character and require a thorough and intensive study before an intelligent support or opposition to the terms of the treaty can be given, and I am certain that very few of the Members of the Senate have as yet given it that study.

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HON. CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS—Continued

can not expand their fleets until 1937, and the United States Navy will, in that period, have a chance to catch up particularly in the cruiser category without being put to the additional expense of matching the building which Great Britain and Japan would, save for the treaty limitations, do, during that period if they went on as they have in the past.

In an entirely different direction I deem the adoption of the treaty as highly advantageous to the United States Navy. I assume that the parity which the treaty permits will mean, with the aid of Congress, that we intend in fact to build to parity just as far and as rapidly as, with due regard for economy and sound judgment, we can. That means that the Navy will be able to adopt a reasoned plan of naval building over the treaty period with assurance that after such general plan be examined and approved, it will be carried out with the aid of Congress without regard to politics or partisan advantage, and without regard to spasmodic irritation which has hitherto marked the efforts of the Navy to get naval appropriations. I hope and expect to see the time come immediately as the result of the London Treaty when naval appropriations in Congress will not be coupled with arguments about the evil possibilities of other navies against us. It is not well to build a navy on suspicion. The United States should build upon an agreed program, a program that can be carried out in an orderly manner. The Navy's morale and effectiveness, as well as economy in building and operation are dependent upon planning ahead just as any business involving construction and maintenance is. There is no real economy in building the navy on bursts of competition caused by the building of other nations. A navy built under this treaty may be built and maintained for less money and more effectively than a navy built without a treaty just as an orderly planned method of doing business is more effective in any undertaking. I emphasize the point that, if such an orderly plan of appropriation be adopted and carried out, it will mean more regular employment in the yards and much better opportunity to the naval constructors to experiment and take advantage of every increase in skill in planning—for the science of naval construction moves rapidly. The 8-inch gun cruisers we are about to build will be much better than those now built; the 6-inch gun cruisers we would build now will show real gain over the *Omaha* type planned during the war period.

I am quite aware that there has been diversity in our naval opinion as to the relative merits of 8-inch and 6-inch gun cruisers. The question has been much in the public mind, far too much, I venture to think, because of the 30,000 tons involved is less than 10 per cent of the cruiser fleet allowed us by the treaty, and less than 3 per cent of the total fleet allowed by the treaty, and because the question is one of expert opinion where there is real doubt. So the London treaty settled the balance between 6-inch and 8-inch guns, as such a question should be settled, by fair judgment, we have an advantage of 33,200 tons in the 8-inch cruisers; Great Britain an advantage of 48,700 tons in the 6-inch gun cruisers, with an option that we may, if we so choose, build exactly the same number of 8-inch cruisers and the same tonnage of 6-inch cruisers as Britain has. There can be no important advantage to either of the two powers, Great

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HON. FREDERICK HALE—Continued

The treaty when it comes to us, of course, will be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and that committee will make its report to the Senate.

I think it is highly essential and entirely fitting that the Committee on Naval Affairs, of which I am chairman and which has to handle all legislation involving the authorization of naval construction, hold hearings and get the best naval opinion on the purely naval problems dealt with by the treaty. Information acquired in these hearings will then be available for the use of the Senate when the treaty comes up for ratification.

I hope very much that Senators will not determine their positions on ratification of a treaty which so vitally affects the national defense of the country until the information to be acquired at these hearings is laid before them.

The purpose of these hearings which we are about to hold is to bring out for the use of the Senate, and for the information of the country, whose good will toward any treaty that we may negotiate with foreign powers is to be maintained, as exhaustive information as it is possible to get as to the effect of the London treaty on the national defense of the country.

It has seemed to me, as stated in my remarks on the floor of the Senate, that as the Committee on Naval Affairs has to handle all legislation involving the authorization of the naval construction resulting from the treaty it is essential and entirely fitting that it should attempt to secure the best naval opinion on the purely naval problems dealt with by the treaty. This should in no way conflict with the work of the Committee on Foreign Relations to which the treaty has properly been referred.

Involving as the treaty does certain radical changes in the naval policy of the United States, I believe it is most important that the Senate should be fully informed as to the reasons for making these changes in naval policies.

If these reasons can be defended and proof can be given that it is to the advantage of the national defense of the country to subscribe to all of the terms of the treaty the Senate will undoubtedly ratify the treaty as it stands.

If it is demonstrated that the treaty as a whole is advantageous but that there are certain changes needed to clarify or to reserve to our country certain rights not protected by the treaty, it is possible that it may be found advisable to add reservations. In any event accurate and complete knowledge of the effect of the treaty and its provisions on the national defense of the country cannot fail to be of advantage to the Senate in dealing with the problems of the treaty, and such adequate information I believe this committee can help to obtain.

If the treaty as it now stands will hold water in every respect there can be no possible objection to throwing the full light of publicity upon it. If it will not hold water it is in the highest degree essential that its defects should be known and understood.—*Extracts, see 5, p. 192.*

REAR ADMIRAL MARK L. BRISTOL
U. S. Navy, Retired

Chairman of the General Board

N 1922 the General Board was required to make exhaustive investigations to establish a United States naval policy giving due consideration to the treaty for the limitation of naval armament, usually referred to as the Washington treaty. The naval policy, as approved by our Government May 16, 1922, defined the requirements of the fleet.

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HON. CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS—Continued

Britain or the United States, because of the difference in 8-inch cruiser tonnage described in the treaty.

I have in my own mind no doubt that the treaty gives parity to the American Navy with the fleet of Great Britain in every category. Parity, as I have used the term and no other meaning seems feasible, means parity in combatant naval strength, and that seems to me the only possible measure of comparison. If in comparing the fleets you go outside the combatant ships themselves and take into account such national assets as merchant marine or military bases; such other balancing national assets as fuel, population, wealth, assured food supplies, and raw materials for construction, must be considered and we should never reach a measure of agreement to stop the competition in building. In justice and of necessity parity means a parity in combatant strength. I assume that it is agreed that the treaty brings parity in battleships. I have never heard anyone question it certainly our naval advisers in London did not question it. On the face of it the treaty insures parity in submarines and destroyers, parity of opportunity in the aircraft carriers, and certainly parity in cruisers if we choose to build the very same units which Britain builds and if we take the option to build more 8-inch gun cruisers, a fair adjustment.

In one other way the treaty is clearly advantageous to us. Our existing Navy was largely built during the war and shortly after. Since that time we have, as I have said, built little. That means that all our fleet tends to grow obsolete at about the same time. That is bad naval practice. It means there are great hills and deep valleys in any program of naval construction to meet obsolescence. Not only does such a ragged program mean that the burden of expense is difficult but the fleet is at all times unevenly balanced and actually a poorer fleet because if we build, for instance, our destroyers all at one time, as we had to during the war, we do not gain by experience in building. Our yards become disorganized and are disbanded at the end of our sporadic building effort. The Navy should—and the treaty will allow it—proceed in all categories uniformly. The sound general plan for the Navy which the treaty permits will take care of that.

To understand our settlement with Japan, we must study the somewhat difficult problem of our present relative strength with that nation.

Building, we have 20,000 tons of 8-inch gun cruisers; she has 68,400 tons.

Of 6-inch gun cruisers she has 98,400 tons; we have 70,000 tons.

Total: We have 90,000 tons to her 166,000 tons.

As we all know, the 8-inch gun cruiser is of more value, ton for ton, than the 6-inch gun ship. You will observe there is a great superiority on her side. In built and building she still has a large superiority. That requires some comment.

Built and building we have 130,000 tons; she has 108,400 tons. In that built and building, 50,000 tons are in this status: 20,000 tons have not yet had their keels laid. They are contracted to outside yards, not our own. Very little work has been done on them. The other 30,000 tons have really nothing done on them. They have technically been started. Certain work has been done on them for guns, and so forth; but it is really a trifle, because we

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REAR ADMIRAL MARK L. BRISTOL—Continued

In 1928 the General Board was directed to consider a revision of the naval policy in order to make any corrections which time and experience might dictate. The United States naval policy as revised was approved October 6, 1928, and is still in effect. This revised policy is essentially the same as the one approved May 16, 1922, over six years before.

The United States naval policy is based upon the General Board's investigation but is established and promulgated by the Secretary of the Navy with the approval of the President of the United States. It has been upheld and enforced by Congress whenever appropriation for development of our fleet has been made.

The General Board is required to advise the Secretary of the Navy; (a) respecting the number and types of ships to constitute the fleet of the United States Navy; (b) regarding the military characteristics to be embodied therein; and (c) to recommend the naval-building program each year for replacement of obsolete ships and for increase of the Navy.

The building program recommended on April 7, 1923, was based upon the belief that the Washington treaty for the limitation of armaments would be ratified also upon the naval policy adopted by the Government.

In that report it was recommended that twenty 8-inch 10,000-ton cruisers were necessary to bring our cruiser tonnage up to the Washington treaty ratios established for capital ships, and that 12 of these cruisers should be built. In 1924 the General Board pointed out very emphatically that our battleships were not on a parity with those of other nations and also recommended building sixteen 10,000-ton, 8-inch ships without delay. In 1925 it was recognized that six 8-inch cruisers had been authorized by Congress and it was urged that two more should be authorized at once, and recommended two a year to build up a proper strength in modern cruisers. In 1927, 1928, and 1929 the board repeated its recommendations to continue building vessels for our Navy to conform to the United States naval policy, and particularly urged the building quickly of 8-inch cruisers; and developing the categories of aircraft carriers, destroyers, and submarines to obtain the 5-5-3 ratios for the whole fleet as soon as possible, likewise to modernize the battleships.

In 1927 a special 5-year building program was recommended for the same purposes. This program was prepared after the Geneva conference and was based on the assumption of Great Britain's announced building program for 8-inch-gun cruisers up to and including the year 1929, and laying down an average of about 30,000 tons each year for the next four years. According to the above program Great Britain would have had 336,000 tons of such cruisers in 1936, and 177,636 tons of cruisers mounting guns of less caliber than 8-inch. The program for the United States would have provided for completing in 1932, 130,000 tons of 8-inch cruisers and having laid down or building in 1936, 150,000 tons—a total of 280,000 tons. There would have been 10 cruisers of the so-called *Omaha* class of 70,500 tons which were the result of the 1916 building program. It must be particularly remembered that they were recommended as a part of our fleet when six battle cruisers were to be built.

Since the Washington treaty whereby the battle cruisers were scrapped only 8-inch cruisers have been recom-

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Pro**HON. CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS—Continued**

took back the plans originally prepared for those ships, having developed a much better plan in the Navy, and therefore, those ships are really just in a stage where the plans are ready, and a trifle of work has been done on them. On that point of view it is necessary to comment on the 130,000 tons built and building. We have really 80,000 tons which, perhaps, might be classed in that category, with 50,000 tons in the state which I have described.

In 6-inch gun cruisers we have 70,000 tons to their 98,000 tons.

In destroyers we have 290,000 tons to their 122,500 tons. Another comment should be made there. Our destroyer strengths are very difficult to compare. We have 290,000 tons of ships built almost entirely during the war; 64,000 tons of those are out of commission forever. Their boilers proved defective, and they have recently been put out of commission. Some of them are not entirely out, but they are substantially out of commission, and it is not contemplated that they will be put in commission again. They probably should be rated as of no value.

We really have 223,000 tons of an average age of 11.2 years. By the Washington treaty limit of 12 years of life only $6\frac{2}{3}$ per cent of life is left. On the 16-year life limit about 30 per cent of life is left.

Otherwise stated, the ships are 70 per cent depreciated in theory.

Before 1936 little of value should be left. However, many of our ships have been laid up and their life has been somewhat lengthened by the process. Japan has steadily built destroyers, and her fleet is far more modern than ours. Our destroyers are on the whole probably more valuable than hers but not enough to offset her superiority in cruisers.

Submarines built stand at 75,000 tons for the United States of America to 66,000 for Japan, and of built and building 80,000 tons for United States of America to 78,000 for Japan.

The Japanese submarines are substantially less old than ours. It would not be easy to know which submarine fleet to choose. We can fairly say then that with an auxiliary fleet of the same or perhaps less value than theirs we had to ask them to stop building, let their fleet deteriorate and permit us to build to a relation of 10.7. It could not be done.

We had no principle of justice to urge. Under the circumstances we made a fair compromise—10.7 in destroyers; 180,000 to 108,400 in 6-inch gun cruisers; three of our ships being about half built on the average, about 10 to 6.5 with the final decision postponed till 1936.

In submarines there was also a compromise. We wanted chiefly low tonnage for naval reasons. We got a reduction of 13,390 tons in her fleet built and 5,000 in built and building. We could have got superiority of tonnage at a higher total figure but deemed this settlement better.

On the whole I think the treaty just and that it offers parity with England and a fair relation to Japan. There is no other possibility of getting as good relations. The old road of competitive building offers no better prospect within six years. As a naval policy it has nothing to promise unless we believe the country ready to back the Navy on a very long expensive and unpromising, not to say unjust, road. *Extracts, see 6, p. 192.*

Con**REAR ADMIRAL MARK L. BRISTOL—Continued**

mended. Also it was specifically recommended to build no more light cruisers—6-inch-gun cruisers. Further remember that Great Britain, if she scraps 5 capital ships now, will have 3 of these battle cruisers remaining with 31.5 knots speed.

This 5-year program further provided for building 77,400 tons of new destroyers, 72,687 tons of submarines, 69,000 tons of aircraft carriers, and laying down 175,000 tons of battleships and a 5-year building program of airplanes. If this building program had been completed the cost by 1936 would have cost \$1,358,000,000.

If the provisions of the London treaty are carried out by 1936 the expenditure for construction of new ships will be 1,073,575,000.

Thus the expenditures by the London treaty would be less than the 5-year building program by about 285,000,000, but in 1936 we would have scrapped 8 battleships, having 15 remaining, of which 5 would be of the latest design and new ships instead of 15 old ships. Also, we would have twenty-eight 8-inch cruisers the type we need, instead of 18, and a number of 6-inch cruisers which are not suited to our needs; also the categories of destroyers and submarines would be in a better condition.

The records of the General Board show that since 1921 one of the military characteristics recommended from year to year for cruisers for the United States Fleet has been for 8-inch guns.

The General Board has consistently and with a continuing policy recommended a fleet second to none but not to be maintained in competition with the fleet of any other nation, believing that thus our fleet would best deter any nation from making war upon the United States and be the greatest stabilizer of world international relations and, therefore, the best possible influence for preserving peace.

I will admit, that in a certain sense it would be in competition; there is no question about that; but the idea was not to institute competition between the two nations if it could possibly be avoided, and it would not be our intention to compete, but simply to maintain a parity.

Our safety is in maintaining a navy second to none. If the most powerful nation of the world, whatever that nation might be or may be in the future, would agree to, say 500,000 tons as a total of the fleet for her country, we would be willing, I am certain, from the naval point of view, to accept 500,000 tons.

In order to provide a fleet second to none there must be some measure of what is parity and especially between the naval strengths of Great Britain and the United States. The measure of parity was admitted at the conference in Washington in 1921-22 for certain categories of naval vessels, namely, battleships and aircraft carriers, and by tacit or outspoken admission ever since it has become recognized. The General Board has become convinced that the only just and fair parity must be based upon an equal number of tons of displacement assigned to the fleets of Great Britain and the United States, and the ratios for other fleets should be based upon the above tonnage. This principle was definitely recognized in the Washington treaty, in which it was stipulated that the tonnage in battleships for Great Britain would be 525,000 tons and for aircraft carriers 135,000 tons, and the United States an equal amount that is parity in these two categories.

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HON. DAVID A. REED,
U. S. Senator, Republican, Pennsylvania,
Delegate to the London Conference.



THE Disarmament Treaty of Washington, made in 1922, limited the building of battleships and airplane carriers, but it failed to limit the building of cruisers and destroyers and submarines. It established a ratio in battleships which ultimately was to be five for us, five for Great Britain and three for Japan, but by the terms of that Treaty that ratio was not reached until 1942. In the interval Great Britain was to have a stronger battleship fleet than we were to have. At the present time, she has 20 battleships to our 18 and Japan's 10. For another thing that Treaty provided for a great replacement program of battleship building. Commencing in 1930, Great Britain and ourselves were each to build 10 new battleships and Japan was to build 6 in the course of six years. The effect of that Treaty was good in so far as it prevented the building of battleships by anybody between 1922 and 1930 and it had a good effect on international relations, as far as it went. But since it limited only some kinds of warships and not others, it had the effect of transferring naval competition from battleships to cruisers and destroyers and submarines, as to which the Washington Conference was unable to agree. That Conference was unable to agree on a ratio for cruisers or destroyers or submarines.

Not let us see what has happened since the Washington Conference. Great Britain and Japan have built up very considerable fleets of cruisers, while we have stood still. They have built modern destroyers and modern submarines to a far greater extent than we have. Practically speaking, our fleet of ships of this nature stands just about where it did at the time of the Washington Conference, except that it is eight years older.

When the American Delegation went to London in January of this year, the American fleet of cruisers consisted of 11 ships in commission, totaling 80,000 tons. The British fleet consisted of 54 cruisers, totaling 327,000 tons. In other words, the British had more than four times the tonnage of cruisers that we had. The Japanese fleet consisted of 29 ships, totaling 166,000 tons, that is to say the Japanese had more than twice the tonnage that we had. As we met in London, the British had more than four times our tonnage of cruisers and the Japanese had more than twice our tonnage. It is worthwhile remembering these facts when you hear talk of maintaining the ratio with Great Britain and Japan. There never was a ratio agreed on with these countries in the Washington Treaty with respect to cruisers. Such an agreement was attempted in Washington, but was never arrived at. You cannot "maintain" something that does not exist, either in theory or in fact.

In destroyers and submarines the condition was almost as bad. It is true that we have a large tonnage of destroyers left over from the World War, but many of them are obsolete and are on the disposal list. Everyone knows that they would be worthless in war. The British and Japanese fleets of destroyers and submarines are more modern and unless we built far more rapidly than these countries their submarine and destroyer fleets would be far greater than ours by 1936. That was the situation that confronted your Delegation when they went to London last January.

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gories of naval vessels, and the ratios for the fleets of the contracting nations should be 5 for Great Britain, 5 for the United States, 3 for Japan, and 1.75 each for France and Italy. The General Board has not been able, after eight years of study, to see any just reason or reasons for changing the principles then established but on the contrary is firmly convinced that limitation in armaments should be based upon tonnage for categories with each nation concerned exercising its sovereign right to utilize this tonnage to build ships best suited to her fleet and to her national security.

Also, that the recognized categories of the fleet are battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and aircraft carriers. These categories are based upon the functions of the vessels in each case. It is necessary to specify the maximum size of the units in each category and of the caliber of guns in order to reasonably restrict the type of ship design, but any further restriction is totally unfair and unjust. Initiative, ingenuity, and special national requirements must guide each nation in utilizing the tonnage assigned. The technical requirements of vessels of war such as speed, armament and defensive powers and arranging the proper balance between these are the real limitations upon the use of any prescribed amount of tonnage for a category of naval ships.

The object of the tripartite conference held at Geneva in 1927 by Great Britain, Japan, and the United States was to reach an agreement to limit the categories of the respective fleets which had not been limited in the Washington treaty. The General Board was required to prepare the agenda of that conference and during its progress to study new questions arising therefrom and submit further recommendations. The preliminary work was practically continuous for three months. This conference started with the assumption that the three powers agreed upon:

- (a) No competition in building naval armament;
- (b) Maintenance of navies at lowest level compatible with national security;
- (c) Keeping naval construction at a minimum for the sake of economy; and
- (d) Adoption of the methods and principles set forth in the Washington treaty as being practical and effective.

The conference of Geneva really failed because Great Britain claimed a cruiser tonnage which in no way represented a reduction of armaments but a real increase, with great expenditures of money by all three countries. Great Britain, in spite of the Washington treaty, put forward a claim for dividing the cruiser category into two classes, which, if agreed to, would have been very much against United States interests.

To quote from the records of the conference, the following is an extract of a statement by the Hon. Hugh Gibson:

The immediate and obvious result of acquiescing in these British proposals would have been that the British Empire would have been able to build exactly what it desired, and that we, on the other hand, would be restrained from building what we consider we might need and yet the tonnage levels insisted on by the British Empire would result in a substantial increase even over present strength.

The United States delegation did suggest that the American requirements regarding cruisers of the larger

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Pro**HON. DAVID A. REED—Continued**

Now let us see what the Treaty of London actually does. In the first place, it provides for immediate parity in battleships with Great Britain and a five to three ratio with Japan. This relationship would not otherwise have been attained until 1942. The Treaty accelerates parity with Great Britain by 11 years and does it by requiring Great Britain to scrap five of her battleships, against three to be scrapped by us and one to be scrapped by Japan. The British ships that are to be scrapped have larger guns than ours and are in all respects better vessels than the three old ships which we are to scrap. In the next place, the Treaty provides that none of us shall build battleships between now and 1936. Inasmuch as a battleship costs to build about forty million dollars, the taxpayers of the United States ought to be well satisfied that this expenditure of four hundred million dollars on 10 unnecessary battleships is being avoided, and I have no doubt that the taxpayers of Great Britain and Japan feel the same way about the savings that result to them.

Now about cruisers—the Treaty provides that cruisers shall be divided into two classes, 1st those armed with guns larger than 6 inches in calibre, and 2nd those with guns of 6 inches or less. When we went to London, the United States had just one 8-inch gun cruiser in commission, Great Britain had 15 and Japan had 8. We had an elaborate building program and so had they. If we prefer to consider cruisers both built and building, then the United States had one built and 12 building, five of which had not even had their keels laid down. Great Britain had 15 built and four building, Japan had 8 built and 4 building. In the large cruisers, the United States had 13 built and building, Great Britain had 19 and Japan had 12. Now then, what does the Treaty do? It provides that we shall go on through the next 6½ years building up our large cruisers until at the end of the Treaty period we have 18, of which 16 are completed and 2 are practically completed. On the other hand, Great Britain, which now has 19 such cruisers, built and building, reduces that number by scrapping 4 during the Treaty period, so that she comes down to 15 against our 18. Japan stands absolutely still with her present 12. In these cruisers, which our Naval General Board says are so important, you will see then that we get better than parity with Great Britain and we get exactly five to three in tonnage with Japan.

Now let us look at the 6-inch cruisers. At the present time, we have 10 such ships in commission and none building. Japan has 21 and Great Britain has 39. Let me repeat these figures again—the United States has 10, Great Britain has 39 and Japan has 21. I am speaking of 6-inch cruisers. By the terms of the London Treaty, the British are reduced from 39 to 35. The Japanese stand still and the American tonnage of such cruisers is permitted to be more than doubled. Does that sound as if we had surrendered American interests at London?

Some of the Nations tried at London to limit the tonnage of the 6-inch cruiser class to 7,000 tons per vessel. The American Delegation opposed that and in these cruisers that we are to build, we have the right to make them of the same tonnage, the same speed and the same cruising radius as the 8-inch cruisers.

At the Geneva Conference in 1927, an effort was made to limit the cruisers of the world's great navies. That effort failed miserably, largely because Great Bri-

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class could be revised downward if it were possible to agree upon a figure materially lower than 400,000 tons for cruisers but this proposal for a compromise also failed.

If the London treaty had not been negotiated and if we had continued to carry out the Washington treaty for replacing battleships, and at the same time completed the fifteen 8-inch cruisers, the 12 destroyers, the 9 submarines and the 1 aircraft carrier already authorized, we would have had in 1936, 5 new battleships, 23 cruisers of the type best suited to our Navy, and made progress in replacing old destroyers and submarines, at a total cost of \$849,014,231, which is less than the London treaty program.—*Extracts, see 6, p. 192.*

REAR ADMIRAL J. V. CHASE
U. S. Navy.



Y point of view is naturally a technical one. I have no knowledge of the political considerations confronting the delegates to the London Naval Conference. Without such knowledge, I do not feel qualified to comment upon political considerations nor to hazard an opinion as to the weight to be given them. On the other hand, I am unable to imagine the possibility of an equitable agreement emerging from a naval limitation conference if technical considerations be ignored.

As I see it, the London conference had two quite distinct and independent tasks to perform.

One task was to modify any article of the Washington treaty which eight years' operation might indicate to be defective. The Washington treaty, like all human documents, is not perfect. This fact was recognized in the treaty itself, for provision was made for convening a conference of the signatory powers for the purpose of remedying any apparent defects. Each article of the treaty was subject to scrutiny for the purpose of bringing to light any defects and of devising suitable remedial modifications.

In my opinion the most defective article from an American point of view is Article XIX. By this article, the United States, Great Britain and Japan relinquish for an indefinite period of time the exercise of their sovereign rights to increase the military and naval facilities within the territory of certain Pacific possessions of those three nations. The territory of the United States to which these restrictions apply is greater in area and value than is the territory of either Britain or Japan to which the same restrictions apply. Moreover, in the case of the United States, these Pacific possessions are much farther from the nearest point of support.

Article XIX, therefore, operates decidedly to the disadvantage of the United States and places this country in an obviously inferior position. The defense of these overseas possessions of the United States, so long as this article remains in force, becomes an exceedingly difficult problem. The influence of this article is far-reaching and produces a marked effect upon the number and military characteristics of the various naval units needed to make up the categories of the Navy of the United States.

It does not appear that Article XIX was brought up for discussion at the London conference.

The only positive action taken by the London confer-

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tain insisted upon the right to have 70 cruisers. Much to the displeasure of her big-navy advocates, she has now agreed to reduce that number from 70 to 50 and that is the limitation imposed upon her by the London Conference. And by the way, if Admirals change their minds, as Admirals have been known to do, the Treaty gives us the option of building 50 ships of the same types and of the same total tonnage as the British cruiser fleet, if we see fit to do so. If that is not parity, it would be hard to tell what is. We may on the other hand insist upon our right to build more of the large cruisers than Great Britain, so that we will have 18 to her 15, with a corresponding reduction in our tonnage of small cruisers. It is here that the whole controversy arises. Our Naval Board wanted the right to build 21 big cruisers against the British 15, whereas the Treaty allows only 18 for us against the British 15. For the 3 8-inch ships, which we surrender, we have the right to build 4 large 6-inch ships, and this whole controversy in the last analysis comes down to the question of the advantages or disadvantages of that alternative. If there was ever a tempest in a teapot, it would seem to be here. The idea is preposterous that a great step forward in the cause of world peace should be rejected because of a disagreement as to the calibre of the guns to be placed on 3 ships out of our great fleet. To some, however, the controversy may seem of sufficient importance to call for a little explanation. Remember that there is nothing to prevent us in the 6-inch cruisers from having the same speed and cruising as the 8-inch ships, and that it will be possible to give them somewhat heavier armor than is carried on the 8-inch vessels, because the weight that is not put into guns can be put into armor. The type of 6 and 8 inch guns now used in the American Navy is excellent. They are both fine weapons from a technical point of view. Each has a muzzle velocity of 3,000 feet per second and each has a range so long that the falling shells cannot be spotted or observed from the ship that fires them. The range of the 8 inch is of course longer than that of the 6 inch, but it is useless unless the fire is observed from the air. In a battle between two such cruisers that one which has the control of the air will have the advantages at the long ranges. It is worth remembering, however, that so far as we can discover no shot has ever been fired in a naval battle in all the world's history at a range of more than 20,000 yards, and the American experts on ordnance and gunnery have advised us without hesitation that under 20,000 yards the 6-inch guns have a great advantage because of their greater rapidity of fire. The 6-inch guns have been fired in battle practice by our fleet as rapidly as eleven shots per minute per gun. The 8-inch, which is machine-loaded, cannot be fired faster than two shots per minute. You can readily see how the 6-inch gun has the advantage at such ranges, particularly when you remember that the 6-inch gun can penetrate the armor of any 8-inch cruiser now in existence at any range up to 20,000 yards. After listening for weeks in this country to naval experts on both sides of the controversy and after continuing these hearings in London with the advisers that accompanied us there, the Delegation came unanimously to the conclusion that the provisions of the Treaty were preferable to those suggested by the Naval General Board. If we were wrong, the difference in the result is trifling, but we still think we were right.—*Extracts, see 7, p. 192.*

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ence with regard to the Washington treaty was to formulate a new definition for an airplane carrier and to modify the battleship replacement program.

There appears to be no objection to the new definition of an airplane carrier and therefore no further comment is necessary.

An examination of the battleship replacement program of the Washington treaty shows that from 1922 to 1936 the United States, as regards capital ships, occupies an inferior position both as to number and tonnage. In 1936, according to the replacement program, the United States attains equality of numbers but does not reach equality of tonnage until 1942. There appears to be no logical reason for the retention of superfluous capital ships by the United States, Great Britain and Japan from 1925 (when the *Rodney* and *Nelson* were completed) until 1936. The scrapping of these superfluous ships now, as prescribed by the London treaty, in my opinion, is undoubtedly a step in the right direction which should have been taken five years ago, thus saving their maintenance and modernization costs.

It will be noted that the Washington treaty replacement program required the United States to abstain from capital ship construction from 1922 until 1931. This "holiday" was objectionable for two reasons: (1) It inevitably must increase the cost per ton of construction when the holiday terminates, due to the deterioration or dismantling of plants and the dispersion of skilled personnel engaged in the manufacture of special material such as armor and armament; and (2) it entails crowding the construction of 15 replacement capital ships into a period of 11 years, thus causing excessive annual expenditures. Moreover, if carried to completion, the United States in 1942 would have 15 capital ships of an average age of 4 years, the oldest being only 9 years old. Obviously such a condition would necessitate another holiday, and the undesirable and uneconomical alternation of periods of great constructional activity and complete idleness would be perpetuated.

The Washington treaty established a 20-year life for capital ships. The most logical and most economical replacement program, in my opinion, would have been to replace each year one-twentieth of the 525,000 tons allotted the United States. By beginning such a program in 1925 the entire replacement could have been completed in 1945 at the rate of 26,250 tons annually. If begun now, the replacement can be completed by the same date at the rate of 35,000 tons annually. One advantage of such a uniform system of replacement is the ease with which reduction may be accomplished at any time by curtailing and easing the program.

The extension of the "holiday" until 1936 adopted by the London conference in no way corrects the defects of the Washington treaty replacement program but rather enhances the evil effects of the holiday prescribed by that treaty. The replacement problem remains unsolved. I doubt the wisdom of deferring its solution.

The second task confronting the London conference was to establish limitations in categories not covered by the Washington treaty. Prior to the London conference the United States claimed "parity" with Great Britain, and that nation publicly conceded our claim. As regards Japan, it was generally believed that that nation would present a claim for a ratio somewhat greater than was

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ADMIRAL WILLIAM V. PRATT
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.



In analyzing this treaty I select three governing factors—(a) good will; (b) naval effectiveness; (c) costs.

Upon the evaluation of these must the decision be arrived at—is the treaty to be placed in the good or bad class so far as the United States as a whole is concerned?

In so far as factor (b) is concerned, viz, naval effectiveness, must the treaty be judged by the naval technician and as his analysis decides on this point alone, so must the treaty be registered as good or bad, from the naval point of view only.

However, even though not satisfactory entirely from the naval point of view alone, this factor (b), naval effectiveness, must be balanced against factors (a) and (c), good will and costs, before the treaty as an entirety can be fairly judged and placed in the class good or bad.

Depending upon whether a country is faced with immediate need for preparing for war, or whether a country is in a state of peace, with a hope of continuing this state of peace, will the three factors assume different relative values. If a country is faced with war and must prepare for it, factor (b) assumes paramount importance over (a) and (c) must be the guiding factor. In this particular case limitations of naval armament in any degree is a detriment to a country in her efforts to prepare for the contingency of war, and in proportion to the wealth and power of a state, is this limitation of armament detrimental from the purely military point of view. This goes without saying, for a rich country can swamp and impoverish a less wealthy country through the very act of unlimited building. It can always, if it so wishes, maintain a superior force. However, it should be recognized that a country so doing faces the imminence of war, whether involuntary or voluntary on her part, and if the latter role be her choice, then she subjects herself to the liability of being placed in the aggressor class. If, on the other hand, the imminence of war does not exist, voluntary or involuntary on her part, and a state of peace does exist, with the hope of its continuance then the factors (a) good will and (c) costs do assume a much higher value relative (b) and must be given appropriate values relative to (b) ranging up and down the scale, from superiority to equality with (b) depending on many world and national considerations entirely outside the purview of (b).

Since the factors (a) and (c) do not fall within the legitimate scope of effort of the purely naval technician, this analysis will confine itself to a review of factor (b), naval effectiveness, as it is influenced by the terms of the treaty.

The first fact facing the naval adviser is this: That the terms of the conference call for limitations and reduction of armament, and that the composition of the conference consists, not of one united body of nationals but of several bodies of nationals, each actuated by its own aims, motives, and necessities. This demands, if agreement is to be reached, mutual concessions and considerations of other national points of view. A second fact is evident, viz, that we cannot proceed with the process of orderly reduction of armament until we have succeeded in imposing limitation upon all types of fighting naval craft. To attempt reduction before limitation is a dis-

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REAR ADMIRAL J. V. CHASE—Continued

established by the Washington treaty, but it is difficult to see how such claim can logically be sustained so long as Article XIX of the Washington treaty remains in force.

Much has been written and spoken concerning "parity," but there appear to be almost as many ideas as to what constitutes "parity" as there are writers or speakers on the subject. One prevalent idea is that parity can be achieved only by exact duplication of ships. This idea, in my opinion, is fundamentally unsound because identical ships do not fulfill the naval needs of two nations equally well on account of the different conditions under which they must operate. Another favorite idea is to base parity upon equality of fighting or naval strength. However attractive such a conception may be from a theoretical point of view, it is wholly impracticable, for the simple reason that fighting strength or naval strength is not susceptible of exact computation. Two nations inevitably assign widely different fighting or naval value to the same ship, and thus make this method of estimating parity of little or no practical value.

After much thought upon the subject, I have come to the conclusion that the only equitable method of estimating parity is one embracing two wholly independent principles, neither of which can be disregarded. The first principle is that each nation must be allotted equal amounts of material from which to construct its category of ships under consideration. The second principle is that each nation must be wholly free to utilize its allotted amount of material in the manner which each nation deems will best meet its particular needs. It is obvious that if one nation be allotted an amount of material smaller than that allotted another nation, the first nation is handicapped and is denied an equality of opportunity. Disregard of the second principle produces a similar inequitable state of affairs. If a nation be required to cut its cloth according to a pattern not of its own choosing, a misfit is inevitable.

The scrupulous observance of both principles enables each nation to derive from its allotment of material a result best suited to its peculiar needs. When each nation is thus in a position to make the most of its opportunity without let or hindrance, parity may rightly be assumed to exist.

It will be noted that this conception of parity absolutely forbids the subdivision of categories into classes by armament, size, speed, or other characteristic, but in no way prevents the imposition of limits as to maximum size of unit or maximum caliber of gun.

It may be asked: How is a nation to determine what is the best disposition of its allotted tonnage? The answer is by careful analysis of the various elements entering into the problem, free discussion and decision, all within the councils of the nation. The whole matter is obviously a domestic question, not an international affair.

In regard to categories upon which limitation has been effected by the London treaty and the Washington treaty it will be noted that the Washington treaty ratio of 5:5:3 is maintained exactly only in the aircraft carriers category. In all other categories the United States is below the ratio with respect to Great Britain or Japan. In the capital-ship category the United States is slightly above the ratio with respect to Japan but below the ratio with respect to Great Britain. Parity with Great Britain is attained in the aircraft carrier, destroyer, and submarine categories. In the cruiser category the lack of parity with

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orderly process. To enter into the field of limitation without previous adequate preparation from the statesmen, the technicians, and from the material point of view is to enter at a disadvantage.

From the technical point of view of the naval adviser, his immediate problem is, as affecting limitation, to secure (a) parity on the one hand and (b) the status quo or a proper ratio of naval strength on the other. And, finally, in whatever agreements are arrived at, he must endeavor to see that no terms are arrived at which seriously prejudice the naval position of the United States.

Now in effecting actual parity, and in securing desirable relative ratios in combatant ships, the problem can be looked at from two viewpoints (c) naval sea strength in the broad (d) fleet combat strength. The introduction of the element, limitation of naval armament, affects the technical viewpoint—in the matter of emphasis to be laid upon one or the other of the two factors (c) and (d). Without limitation, the technician can plan for combatant types in sufficient strength, to acquire not only equal fleet combat strength but a sufficient excess of combat types to overcome many if not all natural advantages residing in another power due to the possession of a larger merchant marine, naval, bases, and so forth. With limitation entering into the problem, in the endeavor to secure parity, this broad view comprehended under (c), naval sea strength in the broad is not permissible, more restricted view must be taken, and we must view our problem from the angle of (d) fleet combat strength, which is a definite measurable quantity; also we introduce into the picture intangible quantities, the insertion of which will cause one side to the argument to put forward claims for parity, which the others will easily class as superiority, and which in truth from this angle never can be measured accurately.

Again, can we hope to secure parity in naval combatant types which are the subjects of limitation, if during peace we inject the question of trade routes, either of the enemy to be broken down, or our own to be protected? This problem is further complicated by the fact that peace trade routes are not the war trade routes; neither are the purposes of trade the same in peace as in war, nor the proportions borne by neutrals, combatants, great sea powers and lesser sea powers the same. The arguments which can be advanced by one set of claimants justly in opposition to the views of another are so many that the problem becomes too complicated for solution and amicable agreement. An agreement along these lines may be forced, but it is extremely doubtful if it can be called just, and it most certainly will not be, in all probability, an amicable agreement. On the other hand, in war, sea power is maintained as it always has been in the past by the combat strength of the fleet in being. As to its strength, composition, organization, training, location and operation, so goes the war, and with it a hundred incidentals, such as where your trade routes lie and what they may be, what real pressure over and above unexpected raids you may put on the enemy trade, and even what proportion of his or yours may pass into the hands of neutrals. The measure of fleet combat strength is a tangible thing; it can be made with reasonable accuracy, and in the endeavor to attain parity between nations in naval strength, or to secure satisfactory relative strength it offers probably the best road along which limitation can

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Great Britain as regards tonnage is very marked. In this category, moreover, the freedom of disposition of allotted tonnage on the part of the United States is much abridged.

It may also be noted that if the United States were allotted a cruiser tonnage of 339,000 tons with freedom to dispose this allotted tonnage as it might desire, parity with Great Britain in all categories, except that of capital ships, would be assured. In the capital-ship category the inferiority of the United States with respect to Great Britain would be slight. Under these same conditions Japan's ratio with respect to the United States would still be above the Washington treaty ratio, but her excess in this respect would not be so great as under the terms of the London treaty, and therefore, in my opinion would be more nearly acceptable to the United States.—*Extracts, see 6, p. 192.*

CAPTAIN DUDLEY W. KNOX,
United States Navy, Retired.

N 1922 the United States signed the first naval limitation agreement, of which President Coolidge said in 1928:

"It no doubt has some significance that foreign governments made agreements limiting that class of combat vessels in which we were superior but refused limitation in the class in which they were superior. We made altogether the heaviest sacrifice in scrapping work which was already in existence."

Evidently we had made a magnanimous gesture toward promoting moderation in armaments through the force of example. Supplementing this example was a clause in the preamble to the treaty declaring that one of its two cardinal objects was "to reduce the burdens of competition in armaments."

During the succeeding eight years the United States scrupulously adhered to the spirit of the treaty by laying down only 11 ships in the categories which had no limitation upon them. What was the outcome of this still further effort to influence other nations through our example? During the same interval when we laid down 11 ships the other four parties to the treaty together laid down a total of 336 ships, or an average of 84 apiece.

The other countries thus failed to follow our example in so scrupulously keeping within the spirit of the treaty. It was a direct consequence of our great restraint in building between 1922 and 1930 that we came to the London conference with a very low ratio of cruiser strength to serve as a status quo basis for diplomatic negotiations. Instead of our past sacrifice and restraint operating in our favor at London they appear to have been used against us. That other nations are making a great concession in slowing down future cruiser construction while we catch up, and that therefore we should concede something to them in the general cruiser ratio, seems to be the basis of their reasoning. The net result is a penalty for us for having made the greatest sacrifice at Washington in 1922 and for having subsequently exercised an unmatched restraint in adhering to the spirit of that treaty. Instead of the Washington conference 5-5-3 ratio the cruiser ratio, counting both categories, finally is to become 5 for us, 5.2 for Great Britain, and 3.2 for Japan; this assuming that we build our full quota of the badly wanted 8-inch-gun cruisers. Such is the reward for our scruples and restraint.

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travel and arrive at agreement. It was the estimate of fleet combat strengths which was used in attempting to arrive at agreement through the instrument of this treaty.

The types to consider are: (1) battleships; (2) aircraft carriers; (3) exempt types; (4) destroyers; (5) submarines; and (6) cruisers. The treaty hinges about these types, and the proportion allocated to each power.

Take (1) battleships first. The number has been reduced in the proportion 15-15-9. The tonnage proportions are as equitable as it is possible to make them. The strength factor of each fleet will, with the remodernizing of our fleet and the elevation of guns, be fairly commensurate with the above figures.

(2) The aircraft carrier tonnage was not touched. It remains as in the Washington treaty.

(3) The agreement on the exempt classes is satisfactory and equitable. It is not an important class. It takes in merely worn-out ships and special ships outside the combatant categories. No concessions made in this type have the slightest effect on the strength of the combat fleet.

(4) The destroyer tonnage has not been reduced below a safe peace margin, and is not less than that which we would operate in peace for fleet training purposes. Its proportions are 10-10-7. It is a type easily built at reasonably short notice and is a type which in war we would hardly have thought of. The concession of 10-10-7 now in this type does not materially affect fleet combat strength in time of war.

(5) Submarine: The proportions in tonnage are 10-10-10, but by this concession total tonnage is reduced. The total abolition of submarines would be an excellent thing for the United States naval policy, but failing this the tonnage figure set at 52,700 is not below our irreducible need in case the submarine is not abolished.

(6) The cruiser: It is about this type that the fight wages and the question is raised whether we sacrificed any of our naval strength. This problem was solved also on the basis of fleet combat strength. The tonnage proportions of the 8-inch type are 10-8-1-6; in the 6-inch type 10-7-5 between Great Britain and ourselves and 10-7 between ourselves and Japan. Regardless of the superior merits of the 8-inch type claimed by some for individual ship action and long-distance raiding on enemy trade routes, I prefer for fleet work a more even distribution of the two types of cruisers, the 8-inch and 6-inch, and the present arrangement of eighteen 8-inch and eighteen 6-inch units as allowed under the treaty is better for fleet needs than an all 8-inch cruiser tonnage.

(7) From the viewpoint of fleet combat strength, I feel that the treaty is most satisfactory.

There is one additional feature which makes this treaty particularly acceptable from the naval point of view. Now for the first time in our history we can lay down a definite program extending over a period of time and visualize a Navy, which is not a creature of great ups and downs, in the matter of a naval building program. We should be able to iron out the humps caused by such excessive building as happened in the 1916 battleship program and the 1917-18 destroyer programs, and through its agency we should be able to forestall any great naval depression. Moreover, the added life to each combatant category as specified in this treaty over the figures mentioned in the American proposal of 1922 has materially reduced the yearly naval wastage.—*Extracts, see 6, p. 192.*

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The equity of altering the cruiser ratio against us should not be measured by ethics alone. When we went into the London conference we had a very large preponderance in destroyer and submarine strength. This was a legacy from the war and was in no degree a consequence of construction during the period covered by a limitation of armaments agreement.

These and other aspects of the treaty constitute very material disadvantages for the United States, over and above comparison based on tonnage alone.

To sum up:

1. Our example of sacrifice in 1922 and, thereafter, our restraint in building, found us with a deficient cruiser tonnage at the recent conference. This was approximately balanced by our superiority in destroyers and submarines inherited from the war.

2. By the London treaty other nations have agreed to slow down their cruiser construction while we catch up. We similarly allow them to catch up with our destroyer and submarine strength. In addition we consent to an elevation of their ratio above 5-5-3 in all three categories of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines.

3. This is notwithstanding a moral commitment on the 5-5-3 ratio for auxiliary tonnage, at the Washington conference, upon which our sacrifices there were in part predicated.

4. This treaty represents a fundamental change in our naval policy, since it unduly subordinates the function of commerce protection, in favor of the combat strength of the concentrated fleet.

5. Trade protection as the primary mission of navies has been a doctrine upheld by the best political economic and naval thought of both the United States and Great Britain for more than a century.

6. We especially need a maximum of 8-inch gun cruisers to partially overcome the great advantage possessed by other powers in trade protecting ability, through their great superiority in battle cruisers, naval bases, and merchant auxiliary cruisers.

7. This treaty not only fails to allow us a sufficient proportion of 8-inch gun cruisers, but also cuts down our general ratio of auxiliary naval craft to 5, as compared with 5.1 for Britain and 3.5 for Japan.

8. The combat strength of the fleet is represented principally by the offensive and defensive qualities of the battleships. In this we will not approach parity with Great Britain until after a very expensive modernization of our existing battleships. Such parity would be accomplished as cheaply and more effectively by the construction of two new battleships.

9. Through several special provisions of the treaty in favor of Britain and Japan they are enabled to modernize their cruiser, destroyer, and submarine forces by the construction of new ships to replace old ones; generally in advance of the normal time when such replacement would be called for.

10. Largely through these latter provisions the ratio of auxiliary vessels in 1936, counting ships both built and building, will closely approximate 5 for us, 5.7 for Britain, and 3.6 for Japan.

11. The final tonnage strengths of the entire navies of the three powers, as contemplated by the treaty, will ultimately become 5 for the United States, 5.2 for Great Britain, and 3.25 for Japan.—*Extracts, see 8, p. 192.*

British Statesmen Debate the London Treaty

Ramsay MacDonald vs. Winston Churchill

HON. RAMSAY MACDONALD
Prime Minister, Great Britain.

 SINCE the last war we have created the League of Nations. We have signed arbitration treaties of varying scope. We have signed treaties of peace, Peace Pacts, like the Kellogg Pact, but curiously enough, when we came to close purposes on the problem of armaments and the provision of arms, the mentality and assumption regarding how wars are to be kept off and national security established were such that we found deplorably little trust placed upon these peace pacts and the organizations to secure peace.

The nations are undoubtedly falling back into their old mentality. The old fears, the old superstitious fears regarding security are returning and exactly the same kind of arguments that were so familiar before 1914 are coming back unblushing and unashamed in 1930. I do not say these things in order to strike a pessimistic note. Quite the opposite, because the time is still with us when we can stop it, and by making a sturdy effort to change that mentality and to hold back the tide that is flowing to international destruction, we can save Europe and the world from what is called the next war. We had these things in mind during the long days of the London Naval Conference. There was a general view that very little could be done by way of advance in naval disarmament until the United States and ourselves had come to an agreement. I think that view was sound.

We had come to an agreement on words. Our predecessors had said, quite candidly, that they were perfectly willing that the United States should build to parity, but what had not been said was what was the programme of parity, and there was a school, or certain individuals—certain friends of mine—who had come to the view that it was unnecessary to pursue the agreement any further. Their view was, "Just let us say 'parity.' We never could imagine a conflict with America. Why should we worry about the force that America is putting upon the waters, whether they are putting 8-inch gun cruisers or 6-inch gun cruisers or whatever they care to build. It is no concern of ours." That view is a very attractive one, but it is a very unsound one. If the whole world occupied with America the same relation which we do, it might be a very sound view, but, unfortunately, that is not the case, and whether we take notice of what is being done on the other side of the Atlantic or not, other nations will. With those other nations we are concerned, and, consequently, one has to come to the conclusion, and I have come to the conclusion, after very careful consideration, that the foundation of a real, secure international understanding relating to naval building, must be an agreement between America and ourselves such as we were able to effect at the London Naval Conference. That piece of work had been done.

What is so disturbing to peace is not always so much the size of fleets, as the growing competition in the building of fleets. The most deadly thing that can arise is a return of that competition which existed, between Ger-

HON. WINSTON CHURCHILL,
Member, British House of Commons



E must recognize, first of all, that the policy of a naval agreement with the United States or other Powers, so far as possible supplementary to the Washington Agreement of 1921, has been accepted in principle by all parties in Great Britain. The Prime Minister and his colleagues were therefore, it seems, justified in their efforts to arrive at such an agreement. We ourselves had made a series of important proposals designed to avert or slacken naval competition in armaments and make more secure the growing strength of the foundations of peace. Finally, we do not and must not forget that the Clauses in the Treaty of Versailles have bound victorious Powers to pursue faithfully and earnestly a policy of disarmament, not only naval disarmament, but, as the Prime Minister has reminded us, naval, military and air disarmament all stand together. It is our belief that we have done by action and example more than any other signatory Power of the Treaty of Versailles or indeed of any other Power in the world. That is a course which we are determined steadfastly to pursue, so far as the national safety and interest of the British Empire or of the Commonwealth of Nations, if that term be preferred, will allow. I must also recognize that the Prime Minister in his protracted and difficult negotiations has made a personal contribution of forbearance, sincerity and patience which, quite apart from the merits of this Treaty, command general respect in this country. There is no doubt that the visit of the Prime Minister to the United States was the occasion for a marked and impressive manifestation of American good will towards Great Britain, the calling forth of which was in itself a service to the State.

The practical question which lies before us is the wisdom or unwisdom, the merits or demerits of the proposed agreement itself. The Agreement of London is not the natural successor or child of the Washington Agreement of 1921, but, on the contrary, differs fundamentally from it. That is my first submission. My second is that it is not a Treaty of parity at all in the sense that Great Britain and the United States should be equal Powers upon the sea, but that, on the contrary, it is a formal acceptance by Great Britain of definitely inferior seapower. Thirdly, I submit that the London Agreement contains within itself subsidiary provisions which will have the effect of ensuring that that inferiority is attained before the Treaty comes to be revised in 1936. Those are my three main submissions, and I will endeavor to make them good.

The Washington Treaty rested upon the basis that Great Britain and the United States should be equal in all the battle elements of their respective fleets. It was confined exclusively to those elements. It did not raise any question of that disparity which we can imagine to exist between this small, densely populated island, the centre of a commonwealth of nations and dependencies spread all over the world, and lying itself in the closest proximity to European centres, between that entity on the one hand and on the other the vast State, almost

Continued on next page

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Pro**HON. RAMSAY MACDONALD—Continued**

many and ourselves prior to 1914. Unfortunately, that was beginning and, therefore, as soon as the opportunity arose to get the five leading naval Powers of the world at the moment at any rate, to come together, we had to strive with might and main to come to an agreement which would end competition.

I say quite candidly that if it had been necessary to increase the size of our fleet, in order to have got an agreement which would have ended competition, it would have been an economy. It would have been wisdom, for the time being to increase the size of the fleet rather than lose the opportunity of getting certain standards set, upon which further negotiations could proceed. However great the failure—or I would rather put in however imperfect the success—of the Washington Conference, the limitation in expanding tonnage, put into capital ships and aircraft carriers, has had a tremendous effect in keeping those buildings stable. It gave us a chance, which we took, of considering not programmes which are most difficult things to manipulate when you are negotiating, but considering actual strengths, and, in consequence, being able to reduce these figures without one-tenth of the trouble which we had to reduce figures regarding regulated categories of ships both in this country and in the others. The stopping of competition in building is worth a great sacrifice. We have given nothing by way of expansion. We have succeeded, as regards three Powers at any rate, in stopping competition, and we have also succeeded in getting from the other two Powers declarations that they are going to consider the situation in which they find themselves, with a decided and decisive determination to accommodate their building in the future to the standardization that has been put into the London Treaty. That is a very great achievement.

So far as reduction is concerned, we were only able to get three Powers to agree to it. But the story is not yet finished. It is still being continued, and all I can say at the present moment—if I may say so without doing any harm—is that after such speeches as that delivered by Signor Grandi, breathing the very best spirit that animated the London Naval Conference, I am encouraged to entertain hopes that the continuing conversations will be successful. The Conference at Geneva was a three-Power conference, and anyone who likes an easy job must have envied those who had to handle, not only three Powers, because that is only part of the easy business, but those who had to handle a three-Power conference which had unified interests—and I am not at all sure that the spectacular effect might not have been very much greater if the London Naval Conference had been from the beginning only a three-Power conference. A three-Power conference would have been a high seas conference pure and simple—America, Japan and ourselves—but Great Britain never could get security on only the agreement of a three-Power conference. We had to face the tremendously more complicated and difficult problem of grouping the United States and Japan with ourselves for what I have called high sea purposes, and then group France, Italy and ourselves for European Continental purposes.

It is a gigantic task. We have simply made a little nibble at the cherry. There is no use magnifying it and

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Con**HON. WINSTON CHURCHILL—Continued**

a Continent, virtually self-supporting in every essential of life and power, separated by thousands of miles on all flanks from all possible attack. None of the disparity was raised by the Washington Treaty of 1921. It confined itself to the battle sphere. It left unfettered our rights to take the necessary measures, whatever we might conceive them to be, for the protection of our commerce and our food against submarines by means of cruisers, convoy vessels—an expression which should be taken into consideration by naval representatives—and also our rights to make provision for flotillas and small craft as they might be required as long as submarines remain a great factor in the narrow waters and inland seas through which so much of our economic life has to flow.

My second point is this: What we are asked to agree to now is not a treaty of parity at all. Under superficial and paper appearance of parity, this treaty embodies a solemn acceptance, not only by Great Britain, but by the British Empire, of a permanent secondary position in seapower. We have abandoned, in fact—and when I look at some of the clauses I think we have also abandoned in form—the principle of the one-power standard to which our naval strength was reduced after the war. First of all, for some generations we were as strong at sea as all other countries put together. We did not abuse our strength. Next for a long period we adopted the principle of being substantially stronger than the next two strongest Powers combined, the United States not being at that time a factor. Then, when the German danger grew upon us in the early years of this century, we declared our standard of 16 battleships to Germany's 10 and a two-to-one superiority in cruisers and small craft, all Dominion vessels, let me point out, being excluded, and consequently additions to the calculation. I think that is a sound basis, for, after all, the Dominion navies have separate communities of their own to protect, separate difficulties and dangers to face. After the war, at Washington we accepted the one-power standard in all that contributed to battle strength, excluding all other elements necessary for the protection of food supplies.

The Prime Minister asks us to abandon, in effect, the one-Power standard. We are no longer to have a navy equal even for purposes of battle—I say nothing of trade protection—to the other leading navy in the world. That is my assertion.

I come now to my third point. We are allowed a total of 50 cruisers, aggregating 339,000 tons. Leaving the United States out of account, is this sufficient for our needs?

We are deliberately to be made to allow the main character of our cruiser fleet to degenerate into obsolescence, while other Powers will be increasing theirs in numbers and modernity, and when the United States will be making enormous and feverish additions to her naval strength. After more than 20 years' close connection with these matters, I am astonished that any Admiralty board of naval officers could have been found to accept responsibility—and it is a very grave responsibility—for such a ham-stringing stipulation. The effect is obvious; it is to make it certain that our cruiser forces will be reduced to inferiority before the Treaty comes up for revision in 1935 or 1936. That undoubtedly must be considered by us in estimating the importance of the review which we will give to these matters in 1935 or 1936. By

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Action Taken by Congress

A Daily Summary of the Proceedings of the House and Senate

April 18, 1930 to June 14, 1930

Note.—This department contains a record of action on the floor of the House and the Senate. By following it from month to month the reader obtains a compact but complete review of the work actually done by Congress throughout the session. The principal abbreviations used are the following: H. R. means House bill; H. Res. means House Resolution; H. J. Res. means House Joint Resolution; H. Con. Res. means House Concurrent Resolution; S. means Senate Bill; S. Res. means Senate Resolution; S. J. Res. means Senate Joint Resolution, and S. Con. Res. means Senate Concurrent Resolution. If reference is made to the consideration or action by the Senate of a House bill or resolution, it means that the House has passed it and sent it to the Senate, and vice versa.

Friday, April 18, 1930

Senate:

The Senate, as in Committee of the whole, resumed discussion, as unfinished business, of S. 51, to apply the quota provisions of the immigration law to immigrants born in countries of the Western hemisphere.

Messrs. Frazier, N. D., R., and Norris, Nebr., R., spoke on the farm debenture provisions of the Tariff bill.

Under unanimous consent, asked for by Mr. Walsh, Mass., D., the Senate passed H. R. 10118 authorizing the Secretary of War to lend War Department equipment for the use of the American Legion at its twelfth annual convention at Boston in October, 1930.

Mr. Hale, Me., R., spoke on the London Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments and announced that the Senate Committee on Naval affairs would hold hearings on the treaty.

On motion of Mr. Connally, Tex., D., the Senate adjourned until Monday, April 21, on account of the passing of Representative R. Q. Lee, Tex., D.

House:

Under unanimous consent, considered and passed H. R. 1158, the Omnibus Pension bill.

Adjourned until Monday, April 21, on account of the passing of Representative R. Q. Lee, Tex., D.

Monday, April 21, 1930

Senate:

The Vice President announced the appointment of Messrs. Blaine, Wis., R., Hebert, R. I., R., Hastings, Del., R., George, Ga., D., and Hayden, Ariz., D., as the special committee under S. Res. 244 to investigate all leases for post-office buildings and stations.

Messrs. Walsh, Mass., D., Johnson, Calif., R., and Jones, Wash., R., spoke on S. 255, the maternity and infancy bill.

Messrs. Bingham, Conn., R., and Borah, Idaho, R., spoke on the London Naval Treaty.

Mr. Norris, Nebr., R., spoke on his resolution, S. Res. 245, calling for an investigation by the Senate of the holding on the desk of the Speaker of the House the Norris resolution fixing the terms of office of the President and members of Congress.

Resumed consideration of S. 51, the immigration bill, as unfinished business. Rejected and adopted various amendments to the bill.

Recessed.

House:

Considered and passed a number of minor measures on the Consent Calendar.

Passed H. R. 2828, the trade mark bill.

Passed H. R. 10652, authorizing an appropriation of \$147,000 to be used by the Secretary of Commerce for the purchase of land and the construction of a building for radio research investigations.

Received from the White House a message from the President announcing his veto of H. R. 2029, authorizing the coinage of silver 50 cent pieces in commemoration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Gadsden Purchase.

Passed H. J. Res. 243, authorizing a joint investigation by the United States and Canada of the probable effects of the proposed efforts to generate electric power from the movements of the tides of Passamaquoddy and Cobscook Bays. The bill carries an appropriation of \$45,000 for America's share of the expenses.

Passed H. R. 10690, so amending the immigration law that married women, married at the time of the passage of the Immigration Act of 1922 will have the same citizenship rights as those married since 1922.

Passed H. R. 9674, so amending the act of 1910 regulating the parole of Federal prisoners that alien prisoners, eligible for parole, may be paroled and deported.

Passed H. J. Res. 270, authorizing participation by the United States in the Sixth Pan American Child Congress to be held at Lima, Peru, in July, 1930.

Passed S. J. Res. 152 authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to use funds on hand for the relief of farmers in flood and draught stricken areas.

Passed H. R. 1192 authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to proceed with certain construction work at navy yard stations and bases, the total cost of which will be approximately \$9,000,000. Adjourned.

Tuesday, April 22, 1930

Senate:

Mr. Jones, Wash., R., chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, presented to the Senate a letter from the President of the United States, calling to the attention of the Appropriations Committee the statement of the Director of the Budget that the Government is faced with a deficit and suggesting that Congress consider this problem before acting on various pending measures carrying appropriations.

Passed S. J. Res. 156, by Mr. Thomas, Okla., D., appropriating \$254,000 to pay a judgment of the U. S. Court of Claims in favor of the Iowa Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma.

Passed S. Res. 129, by Mr. McKellar, Tenn., D., providing for the appointment of a special committee of the Senate to investigate the sale of vessels by the U. S. Shipping Board.

Resumed consideration of S. 51, the immigration bill. Messrs. Walsh, Mass., Gould, Dill, Ashurst, Harris, Johnson, Kendrick, Wheeler, Black, Hayden, Heflin and others spoke on the bill.

Agreed to begin consideration, at 3 o'clock on Monday, April 29, of the nomination of Judge John J. Parker, of North Carolina, to be Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, adversely reported by the Committee of the Judiciary.

Recessed.

House:

Discussed H. R. 2029, by Representative Hudspeth, Tex., D., providing for the coinage of special silver 50 cent pieces to commemorate the Gadsden Purchase. The President's veto of this bill was received by the House on April 21.

On the question of whether the House would vote to pass the bill over the President's veto the vote was 96 yeas to 244 nays; present 2; not voting 86, and the President's veto was sustained.

Representative Hull, Ill., R., spoke on the rivers and harbors bill.

Sent to conference H. R. 6130, a bill to exempt the Custer National Forest from the operation of the Forest Homestead Law. The Speaker appointed Representatives Colton, Utah, R., Smith, Id., R., and Evans, Mont., D., conferees on the bill.

Representatives Bachmann, W. Va., O'Connor, N. Y., D., Ramseyer, Iowa, R., and Moore, Va., D., spoke on the congestion of business in the Federal Courts.

Representative Summers, Tex., D., spoke on the Federal procedure of impeachment.

Resumed consideration of H. R. 10381, to amend the World War Veterans Act of Oct. 7, 1924.

Representatives Patman, Tex., D., Campbell, Iowa, R., Dunbar, Ill., R., and others spoke on the bill.
Adjourned.

Wednesday, April 23, 1930

Senate:

Mr. Copeland, N. Y., D., spoke against the McKellar resolution (S. Res. 129) for the investigation of the sale of vessels by the Shipping Board, passed by the Senate on April 22, and entered a motion to reconsider the Senate's action on the resolution.

Received a message from the House announcing its disagreement to the Senate amendments to the Department of Agriculture appropriation bill (H. R. 7491) and asking for a conference. Acceded to the House request and voted to instruct the Senate conferees to insist on the Senate amendments.

The Vice President appointed Messrs. McNary, Jones, Wash., R., Capper, Kans., R., Overman, N. D., D., and Harris, Ga., D., as conferees on the bill.

Concurred in House amendments to S. 3477 validating certain applications for entries on public lands.

Resumed consideration of S. 51 to subject certain immigrants born in countries of the Western Hemisphere to the quota under the immigration laws.

Defeated, by a vote of 40 to 23, with 33 not voting, the motion of Mr. Glass, Va., D., to recommit the bill to the Committee on Immigration.

Recessed.

House:

Agreed to the Senate amendments to H. R. 10118, authorizing the Secretary of War to lend army equipment for use at the Twelfth National Convention of the American Legion to be held at Boston in October, 1930.

Representative Sirovich, N. Y., D., offered and spoke on a resolution, H. Res. 211, directing the Committee on the Judiciary to appoint a sub-committee to investigate the bankruptcy laws of the United States and to recommend amendments to the bankruptcy act of 1898. The resolution was referred to the committee on rules.

Resumed consideration of H. R. 10381, to amend the World War Veterans' Act.

Passed S. J. Res. 156, to carry out a judgment of the U. S. Court of Claims in favor of the Iowa Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma.

A similar House bill was laid on the table.

Adjourned.

Thursday, April 24, 1930

Senate:

Passed H. R. 10081, providing for an extension of time in taking a census of the Indians of California.

Mr. McNary, Oreg., R., announced that through inadvertence the names of Mr. Keyes, N. H., R., and Kendrick, Wyo., D., had been left off the list of Senate conferees on the Department of Agriculture appropriation bill and they were added.

Resumed consideration of S. 51, the immigration bill.

Passed H. R. 11704, providing for the placing of contracts for space in air mail planes.

Mr. Sullivan, Wyo., R., spoke on the history of the Oregon Trail.

Recessed.

House:

Discussed and passed H. J. Res. 222 for the appointment of a joint committee of the Senate and House to investigate the pay, pensions, etc., of all persons who served in the military and naval forces of the United States in any war.

Resumed consideration of H. R. 10381, amending the World War Veterans' Act.

Defeated, by a vote of 230 to 145, with 53 not voting, a motion by Representative Johnson, S. D., R., to recommit the bill with instructions.

Passed the bill by a vote of 324 to 49, with 55 not voting.

In response to a question from Representative Garner, Tex., D., the Democratic floor leader, Representative Tilson, Conn., R., the Republican floor leader, announced that he expected the conference committee report on the Tariff Bill to be printed

by April 29, in which event he would call the bill for consideration on May 1.

Adjourned.

Friday, April 25, 1930

Senate:

Mr. Ransdell, La., D., laid before the Senate charges of alleged mistreatment by the Government of Venezuela of James E. Welch, of Louisiana, and others, accompanied by a resolution (S. Res. 253) for an investigation of the cases by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Resumed consideration of S. 51, the immigration bill.

Recommitted the bill to the Committee on Immigration by a vote of 34 to 30, with 32 not voting.

Passed H. R. 10379, providing for the construction of roads in National Forest Reservations at a cost of \$12,500,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1932, and \$12,500,000 for the following fiscal year.

Recessed until Monday, April 28.

House:

Began consideration of H. R. 11781, the rivers and harbors bill.

Representative S. Wallace Dempsey, N. Y., R., chairman of the Committee on Rivers and Harbors, in reporting the bill to the House announced that it authorizes the total appropriation of \$110,000,000, covering a period of 10 years. These appropriations are simply authorized by the bill. Actual appropriation of the money must be recommended by the Committee on Appropriations.

Passed the bill without a roll call.

On motion of Rep. Woodruff, Mich., R., S. 549, authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to proceed with the construction of public works, was sent to conference. The Speaker appointed as House conferees Representatives Woodruff, Mich., R., Darrow, Pa., R., and Vinson, Ga., D.

Adjourned until Monday, April 28.

Monday, April 28, 1930

Senate:

Debated and passed S. 3059, to provide for advance planning of public works for the stabilization of industry and for the prevention of unemployment. This is the first of three unemployment measures introduced by Mr. Wagner, N. Y., D.

Began consideration of, as unfinished business, S. 5060, the second of the Wagner bills.

Confirmed, in open executive session, the nomination of Frederick Huff Payne to be Assistant Secretary of War.

Resumed consideration of the nomination of Judge John J. Parker to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Recessed.

House:

Debated and passed H. R. 10175, the vocational rehabilitation bill.

Began consideration of H. R. 11965, the legislative appropriation bill.

Adjourned.

Tuesday, April 29, 1930

Resumed consideration, in open session, of the nomination of Judge Parker.

Adjourned.

House:

Debated and passed H. R. 1063 to authorize the President to consolidate and coordinate governmental activities affecting war veterans.

Adjourned.

Wednesday, April 30, 1930

Senate:

Resumed, in open executive session, consideration of the nomination of Judge Parker.

Recessed to welcome Senator Joseph T. Robinson, Ark., D., upon his return to the Senate after his four months' stay in London as delegate to the London Naval Conference.

The Vice President appointed Messrs. Harrison, Miss., D., and McNary, Oreg., R., a committee to escort Mr. Robinson

into the Senate Chamber, where he received the congratulations of his colleagues on his work in London.

Continued discussion of the nomination of Judge Parker.

Recessed.

House:

Debated and passed H. R. 11635, to amend the Radio Act of 1927 as regards administration and procedure.

Debated and passed S. 3249, amending existing laws respecting the compensation of vessels for transporting seamen.

Adjourned.

Thursday, May 1, 1930

Senate:

Received from the President of the United States a message transmitting the Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, signed at London April 22, 1930.

On motion of Mr. Borah, Idaho, R., the treaty was ordered printed in the Record and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Resumed, in open executive session, consideration of the nomination of Judge John C. Parker of North Carolina, to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Recessed.

House:

Representative Hawley, Oreg., R., Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, called up the partial conference report on H. R. 2667, the Tariff Bill.

After four hours debate that part of the conference report on which the conferees of both Houses had agreed was adopted by a vote of 241 to 152, with 34 not voting.

After further debate a motion by Representative Collier, Miss., D., to recede and concur in the Senate amendments on the Cement Schedule of the bill, was defeated by a vote of 222 to 167, with 39 not voting.

In response to a parliamentary inquiry from Representative Crisp, Ga., D., the Speaker declared that the vote on the motion of Representative Collier was tantamount to the House insisting on its disagreement to the Senate amendments.

Adjourned.

Friday, May 2, 1930

Senate:

Resumed, in open executive session, consideration of the nomination of Judge John J. Parker of North Carolina, to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Confirmed the nomination of William Lee Brand, to be U. S. Marshal for the Western District of Virginia.

Confirmed a number of nominations of postmasters.

Recessed until Monday, May 5.

House:

Resumed consideration of disputed terms in the conference report on the tariff bill.

Voted on several disputed schedules.

Adjourned.

Saturday, May 3, 1930

Senate:

The Senate was not in session.

House:

Resumed consideration of and debated items in the tariff bill on which the Senate and House conferees were in disagreement.

Adjourned.

Monday, May 5, 1930

Senate:

Mr. Harrison, Miss., D., under unanimous consent, placed in the record a statement signed by economists throughout the country protesting against the tariff bill.

Passed S. Res. 71, authorizing the Committee on Banking and Currency to make a survey of the National and Federal Reserve Banking systems of the country.

Resumed, in open executive session, consideration of the nomination of Judge Parker.

Mr. McKellar, Tenn., D., reported to the Senate that on the night of May 3, his office in the Senate Office Building had been entered and his desks and files rifled.

Recessed.

House:

Considered various bills on the Consent Calendar.

Passed a number of bridge bills.

Passed H. R. 1194, amending the law relative to the appointment of pay clerks of the navy.

Passed H. R. 5410 authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to enlarge tree planting operations on national forests east of the Rocky Mountains.

Passed S. J. Res. 135 appropriating \$25,000 to entertain foreign visitors to the celebrations in observance of the 150th anniversary of the surrender of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown, Va.

Passed H. R. 8806 authorizing the Postmaster General to impose fines in certain instances upon steamship and aircraft carriers of the mails.

Passed H. R. 7933, providing for an assistant chief of naval operations.

Passed H. R. 9939 authorizing the leasing of the Choctaw and Chickasaw lands in Oklahoma for oil and gas purposes.

Passed H. J. Res. 305 providing for the participation of the United States in the International Conference on Load Lines to be held at London in 1930.

Passed, under suspension of the rules, H. R. 12013, to revise and equalize pensions to widows of Civil War veterans.

Adjourned.

Tuesday, May 6, 1930

Senate:

Sent to conference S. 3531, authorizing tree planting in national forests east of the Rocky Mountains, as amended by the House. The Vice President appointed Messrs. McNary, Oreg., R., Norris, Nebr., R., and Ransdell, La., D., conferees on the bill.

Passed H. J. Res. 305, authorizing participation by the United States in the International Conference on Load Lines at London in 1930.

Concurred in House amendments to S. J. Res. 135 providing for Federal participation in the celebration of the 150th anniversary of the Surrender of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown, Va.

Resumed, in open executive session, consideration of the Parker nomination.

Recessed.

House:

Representative Jeremiah E. O'Connell, R. I., D., announced his resignation as a member of the House to accept appointment as an Associate Justice of the Superior Court of Rhode Island.

Representative Sirovich, N. Y., D., announced that he had written a motion picture drama, the leading part in which would be played by Mr. George Bancroft, and urged members of the House to witness the performance as his guests when the picture is shown in Washington in December.

Began consideration of H. R. 11965, the legislative appropriation bill.

Adjourned.

Wednesday, May 7, 1930

Senate:

On motion of Mr. Walsh, Mont., D., seconded by Mr. Fess, O., R., recessed to greet Mr. David A. Reed, Pa., R., upon his return to the Senate from his work as delegate to the London Conference on the Limitation of Armaments.

Resumed, in open executive session, consideration of the nomination of Judge John J. Parker of North Carolina, to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Rejected the nomination of Judge Parker by a vote of 41 to 39, with 16 not voting.

Considered and confirmed a number of nominations on the Executive Calendar.

Began, in Legislative session, consideration of S. 3060 to provide for the establishment of a national employment system.

Mr. Smoot, Utah, R., reported disagreement by the Senate and House conferees on the tariff bill and suggested that the Senate adopt that part of the bill on which the conferees were agreed and ask for further conference on the 8 items in disagreement.

Objection was made and Mr. Smoot moved to send the bill back to conference. This motion was agreed to.

Received and agreed to the conference report on H. R. 6564 the Department of the Interior Appropriation Bill.

Passed H. J. Res. 244 authorizing the President to invite the States of the Union and foreign countries to participate in the International Petroleum Exposition at Tulsa, Okla., October 4-11, 1930.

Passed a number of Indian bills, claim bills, bridge bills, and private bills on the Calendar.

Passed H. R. 7410 to establish a hospital for defective delinquents.
Adjourned.

House:
Passed a number of bills on the Calendar.

Passed H. R. 730, amending the Pure Food Law of 1906, so as to give the Secretary of Agriculture authority to require distinctive and informative labelling of canned goods.

Passed H. R. 10877, to extend the program entered into by the Federal Government for the purchase of lands to protect water sheds.

Discussed S. 108 to suppress unfair and fraudulent practices in the interstate shipment of perishable agricultural products.
Adjourned.

Thursday, May 8, 1930

Senate:
Mr. Pittman, Nev., D., spoke on the silver schedule of the tariff bill.

Mr. Copeland inserted in the *Record* magazine articles and newspaper editorials on prison conditions in the United States.

Passed H. R. 7832 to reorganize the administration of Federal prisons.

Passed, with Senate amendments, H. R. 7412, to provide for the diversification of employment of and training and schooling of Federal prisoners.

Passed several bills for the sale or transfer of Government real property and for construction, repair, etc., on government property, pension bills, public land bills and private bills on the Calendar.

Passed S. 3366, giving the consent and approval of Congress to "The Rio Grande Compact" signed by the Commissioners of the States of Colorado, New Mexico and Texas, February 12, 1929, for the use of the waters of the Rio Grande.

Passed H. R. 7405 to provide for a 5 year construction program for the U. S. Bureau of Fisheries.

Passed, as amended, H. J. Res. 270, to provide for the expenses of United States delegates to the Sixth Pan American Child Congress at Lima, Peru, July, 1930.

Passed, as amended, H. R. 7955, the War Department Appropriation bill.

Agreed to House Amendments to H. R. 6564, the Interior Department Appropriation bill.

Mr. Oddie, Nev., R., placed in the *Record* special reports from the Secretary of Commerce regarding conditions in the silver mining industry.

Began consideration of H. R. 10813, the District of Columbia Appropriation bill.
Recessed.

House:
Passed S. J. Res. 165 authorizing the President of the United States to agree to a settlement reached by special counsel for the Government in the case of the United States against the Sinclair Crude Oil Purchasing Co.

Voted to return the Tariff Bill to conference.

Agreed to the conference report on S. 549 authorizing construction of public works by the Secretary of the Navy.

Agreed to the conference report on H. R. 6564, the Interior Department Appropriation bill.

Representative Letts, Iowa, R., spoke on the celebration of "Mothers' Day."

Resumed consideration of debated, and passed, H. R. 11965, the Legislative Appropriation bill.
Adjourned.

Friday, May 9, 1930

Senate:
Agreed to the conference report on S. 549 authorizing the construction of public works for the Navy.

Resumed consideration of H. R. 10813, the District of Columbia Appropriation bill.

Messrs. Hawes, Mo., D., Vandenberg, Mich., R. Robinson, Ark., D., Watson, Ind., R., Swanson, Va., D., Couzens, Mich., R., Wheeler, Mont., D., spoke on the program of the Steering Committee.

Confirmed several nominations.

Adjourned until Monday, May 12.

House:
Passed H. R. 12205, the omnibus pension bill.

Began consideration of H. R. 12236, the Naval Appropriation bill.

Representative French, Idaho, R., and others spoke on the work of the London Naval Conference.

Representative Estick, Tenn., D., spoke on plans to commemorate the work of the Lewis and Clarke Expedition.

Representative Selvig, Minn., R., spoke on proposed independence for the Philippines.

Representative Garner, Tex., D., the Democratic floor leader, spoke on the tariff.

Agreed to the conference report on H. R. 4138, to enable the mothers of deceased soldiers, sailors and marines buried in cemeteries in European countries to visit those cemeteries.

Passed several bridge bills.

Adjourned until Monday, May 12.

Monday, May 12, 1930

Senate:
Resumed consideration of H. R. 10813, the District of Columbia Appropriation bill; debated and passed the bill.

Sent to conference H. R. 7955, the War Department Appropriation Bill. The Presiding Officer (Mr. Fess, O., in the chair) appointed Messrs. Reed, Pa., R., Jones, Wash., R., Bingham, Conn., R., Greene, Vt., R., Harris, Ga., D., and Kendrick, Wyo., D., as conferees on the bill.

Resumed consideration of S. 3060 for the establishment of a national employment system debated and passed the bill, by a vote of 34 to 27, with 35 not voting.

Began consideration of H. R. 5874, to transfer the prohibition enforcement functions from the Treasury to the Department of Justice.

Considered a number of bills on the Calendar.

Passed S. 2043, to expand the foreign field service of the Department of Agriculture.

Passed S. 2836 to admit to the United States Chinese wives of certain American citizens.

Passed H. R. 156 for the disposal of unproductive lands on Federal irrigation projects.

Passed S. 872 for the relief of certain Indian tribes in Montana, Idaho and Washington.

Passed S. 1792 to provide for an additional district judge for the Southern district of California.

Passed S. 4030 to provide books for the adult blind in the Library of Congress.

Adjourned.

House:
Sent to conference H. R. 7955, the War Department Appropriation bill.

The Speaker appointed Representative Barbour, Calif., R., Clague, Minn., R., Taber, N. Y., R., Collins, Miss., D., and Wright, Ga., D., as conferees.

Agreed to the conference report on H. R. S. 531, the Treasury and Postoffice Appropriation bills.

Agreed to the Senate amendments to H. R. 11588, the Civil War pension bill.

Passed H. J. Res. 327 authorizing the presentation of medals to the officers and men of the Byrd Antarctic expedition.

Disposed of a number of District of Columbia bills.

Resumed consideration of H. R. 12236 the Naval Appropriation bill.

Representative Brand, Ga., D., spoke on the Federal Reserve Bank system.

Passed S. 4057, to extend the time for cutting timber on certain public land in Oregon.

Adjourned.

Tuesday, May 13, 1930

Senate:
Passed H. R. 10171 authorizing the Secretary of War to erect at Clinton, N. C., a monument in commemoration of William Rufus King, former Vice President of the United States.

Agreed to the conference report on 9323, the Civil War Pension Bill.

Sent to conference S. 476, the Spanish War Veterans pension bill. The Vice President appointed Messrs. Robinson, Ind., R., Norbeck, S. D., R., and Wheeler, Mont., D., conferees on the bill.

Mr. Norris, Neb., R., and Fess, O., R., spoke on the Norris resolution, S. Res. 262, calling on the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia for a report on the status of the court procedure against Thomas W. Cunningham, described as a recalcitrant witness before the special committee for the investigation of Senatorial Campaigns in 1926.

Mr. Black, Ala., D., spoke on the tariff vote records of Democratic Senators.

Agreed by a vote of 51 to 16, with 29 not voting, to the motion of Mr. Copeland, N. Y., D., to reconsider the vote on S. 51, the immigration bill.

Agreed to an amendment offered by Mr. Harris, Ga., to strike out all of S. 51 but the enacting clause and substitute a provision applying the quota law to Mexico only, leaving other Latin American countries outside the quota, and passed the bill.

Passed H. R. 26 for the establishment of the George Washington Memorial Parkway along the Potomac River from Mount Vernon and Fort Washington to Great Falls, at a cost of \$9,000,000, with a Senate amendment appropriating \$16,000,000

for the further development of the park system of Washington. Messrs. Ransdell, La., D., Copeland, N. Y., D., and McKellar, Tenn., D., spoke on mail contracts for the American Merchant Marine.

Executive Session.
Recessed.

House:

Agreed to Senate amendments to H. R. 7768 for the sale of postoffice and court house building at Syracuse, N. Y.

Passed a number of private bills.

Resumed consideration of H. R. 12236, the Naval Appropriation bill.

Representative Knutson, Minn., R., spoke on Philippine Independence.

Mr. Lankford, Ga., D., spoke on the tariff.

Passed S. J. Res. 163 to repay to certain Indians the amount of taxes illegally collected.

Adjourned.

Wednesday, May 14, 1930

Senate:

Agreed, under unanimous consent, to S. Res. 263, offered by Mr. Wheeler, Mont., D., extending the time of the Committee on Indian Affairs for making a general survey of Indian conditions. The original resolution directing the survey was adopted by the Senate February 1, 1928.

On motion of Mr. Robinson, Ind., R., rescinded the vote of April 13, disagreeing to the House amendment to S. 476, the Spanish War Veterans' Pension bill, and concurred in the House amendment.

Resumed consideration of and debated, H. R. 5874, the prohibition transfer bill.

Passed the bill, with several committee amendments, without a record vote.

Began consideration of S. Res. 227, making certain changes in the rules of the Senate.

Adjourned.

House:

Debated and passed with House amendments S. 108 to suppress unfair and fraudulent practices in the marketing of agricultural products.

Considered and debated H. R. 2152, to expand the foreign field service of the Department of Agriculture.

Adjourned.

Thursday, May 15, 1930

Senate:

Sent to conference S. 108, the perishable agricultural products bill. The Vice President appointed Messrs. McNary, Oreg., Thomas, Idaho, R., and Ransdell, La., D., conferees on the bill.

Mr. Blease, S. C., D., placed in the *Record* historical data concerning the destruction of property in Columbia, S. C., during the Civil War.

House:

Held joint Memorial exercises with the Senate for deceased members of the Senate and House.

Adjourned as a mark of further respect to deceased members.

Friday, May 16, 1930

Senate:

Debated and passed S. 2370 increasing the salaries in the Police Department of the District of Columbia.

Passed, by a vote of 42 to 23, with 31 not voting, S. Res. 206 calling on the Secretary of Commerce to furnish the Senate with certain information on aircraft accidents since May 20, 1926.

Debated, amended and passed S. Res. 227 making certain changes in the rules of the Senate.

Passed, under unanimous consent, H. R. 6807, establishing two new institutions for the confinement of United States prisoners.

Executive session.

Adjourned until Monday, May 19.

House:

Passed H. R. 12302, the Civil War Pensions bill.

Sent to conference, S. 108, the perishable market products bill. The Speaker appointed Representatives Haugen, Iowa, R., Purcell, Ind., R., and Aswell, La., D., conferees on the bill.

Passed, by a vote of 195 to 75, H. R. 2152 to expand the foreign field service of the Department of Agriculture.

Agreed to Senate amendments to H. R. 8154 providing for the lease of oil and gas deposits in or under railroads and other rights of way.

Resumed consideration of, debated and passed, H. R. 12236, the Naval Appropriation bill.

Adjourned until Monday, May 19.

Monday, May 19, 1930

Senate:

Passed H. R. 9843 authorizing the Secretary of War to improve the approaches and surroundings to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at Arlington National Cemetery, Va.

Debated and agreed to S. Res. 270, relieving the Senate conferees on the tariff bill from their promise that no agreement should be made in conference on the farm debenture and flexible provisions of the bill until the Senate had taken a separate vote on these provisions.

Passed H. J. Res. 327 authorizing the presentation of medals to the officers and men of the Byrd Antarctic Expedition.

Sent to conference H. R. 10813, the District of Columbia Appropriation bill. The Vice President appointed Messrs. Birmingham, Conn., R., Phipps, Colo., R., Capper, Kans., R., Glass, Va., D., and Kendrick, Wyo., D., conferees on the bill.

Adjourned.

House:

Agreed to Senate amendments on H. R. 1234 to authorize the Postmaster General to impose demurrage charges on undelivered, collect on delivery parcels.

Agreed to the Senate amendments to H. R. 8574, the prohibition transfer bill.

Sent to conference H. R. 10813 the District of Columbia Appropriation bill. The Speaker appointed Messrs. Simmons, Nebr., R., Holaday, Ill., R., Thatcher, Ky., R., Cannon, Mo., D., and Collins, Miss., D., conferees on the bill.

Debated and passed, with amendments, H. R. 200 granting the consent of Congress to compacts and agreements among the States of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming with respect to the apportionment of the waters of the Colorado River and other rivers and streams in which such states are jointly interested.

Passed H. R. 8163, to facilitate the administration of the national parks by the Department of the Interior.

Passed H. R. 10375 to provide for the retirement of disabled nurses in the Navy.

Passed H. R. 10662 providing for hospitalization of transferred members of the Fleet Naval Reserve and Fleet Marine Corps Reserve.

Passed H. R. 6142, to authorize the Secretary of the Navy to lease the Naval destroyer and submarine base at Squantum, Mass.

Passed H. R. 9707 to authorize the town of Ketchikan, Alaska, to issue bonds up to \$1,000,000 for public works.

Passed S. 3189 for the relief of the State of South Carolina for the destruction of bridges and roads by floods in 1929.

Passed a number of bridge bills.

Passed H. R. 1143 for the purchase of additional land for enlarging the Capitol Grounds.

Passed H. R. 11978 for the appointment of additional employees in the executive branch and the District of Columbia.

Passed H. R. 1157 for the erecting at Edenton, N. C., in memory of Joseph Hawes, signer of the Declaration of Independence, and member of the Continental Congress.

Passed, under suspension of the rules, S. 1171, establishing a National Institute of Public Health in or near the District of Columbia.

Adjourned.

Tuesday, May 20, 1930

Senate:

Agreed to the conference report on H. R. 7491, the Department of Agriculture Appropriation bill.

Agreed to S. Res. 262 calling on the U. S. Attorney for the District of Columbia on the status of court proceedings against Thomas W. Cunningham, an alleged recalcitrant witness before the Senate Committee investigating campaign expenses.

Began consideration of H. R. 11965, the Legislative Appropriation bill.

Debated S. J. Res. 161 to suspend the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission to approve consolidation of railway properties.

Executive Session.

Confirmed the nomination of Owen J. Roberts of Pennsylvania to be Associate Judge of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Adjourned.

House:

Mrs. Norton, N. J., D., spoke on prohibition.

Passed H. J. Res. 282 authorizing the appointment of an envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the Union of South Africa.

Passed S. 320 authorizing the reconstruction of a public road in Wind River Indian Reservation, Wyoming.

Passed H. R. 9370 for modernization of the Naval Observatory, Washington, D. C.

Passed H. R. 11679 to extend hospital facilities to retired officers and employees of the Lighthouse Service.

Passed H. R. 5190 advancing the date for the establishment of emergency Star route mail services.

Passed H. R. 11007 amending the laws covering the railway mail service.

Passed H. J. Res. 280 to authorize participation by the United States in the Interparliamentary Union.

Passed S. 3817 for the improvement of National Forests.

Passed H. R. 10082 authorizing the U. S. Marine Band to attend the Encampment of the Grand Army of the Republic at Cincinnati in August, 1930.

Passed a number of other bills on the consent Calendar.

Agreed to a conference report on H. R. 7491 the Department of Agriculture Appropriation bill.

Adjourned.

Wednesday, May 21, 1930

Senate:

Agreed to House amendments to S. 1171 to establish a national institute of health.

Mr. Ransdell, La., D., author of the bill, placed in the Record data dealing with the origin and purposes of the bill.

Mr. Caraway, Ark., D., chairman of the sub-committee of the Committee on the Judiciary, known as the "Lobby Committee," filed a report criticizing Claudius H. Houston, chairman of the Republican National Committee for his activities in connection with the Tennessee River Improvement Association's alleged support of the American Cyanamid Company's offer for Muscle Shoals.

Mr. Robinson, Ind., R., a member of the Lobby Committee, stated that he had not signed the report because he deemed it purely and wholly political.

Mr. Robinson spoke on the campaign expenditures of the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment.

Agreed to House amendments to S. 195, to facilitate the administration of National Parks.

Resumed consideration and debated S. J. Res. 161, to suspend the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission to approve consolidation of railways.

Mr. Walsh, Mass., D., spoke on British American Naval parity.

Passed, by a vote of 46 to 27, with 23 not voting, S. J. Res. 195, the railroad consolidation resolution, with a number of amendments.

Began consideration of H. R. 6, to amend the definition of oleomargarine contained in the Act of August 2, 1886.

Adjourned.

House:

Agreed to Senate amendments to H. R. 6807, establishing two institutions for the confinement of Federal prisoners.

Agreed to Senate amendments to H. R. 3975 to amend the Federal Code with relation to probation officers.

Agreed to Senate amendments to H. R. 7412 to provide for diversification of employment for Federal prisoners.

Debated and passed H. R. 9110 for the grading, and classification of clerks in the foreign service of the United States.

Debated and passed, by a vote of 226 to 32 with 139 not voting, H. R. 11371 to provide living quarters for civilian officers and employees of the Government stationed in foreign countries.

Debated and passed, by a vote of 233 to 15, with 179 not voting, H. J. Res. 331 expressing the approval of the Congress of the United States of the action of the American delegation at the Hague Conference on the Codification of International Law in voting against "the convention on certain questions relating to the conflict of nationality laws" and declaring equality of the sexes to be an American policy.

Adjourned.

Thursday, May 22, 1930

Senate:

Mr. Robinson, Ind., R., presented a minority report from the sub-committee of the Committee on the Judiciary, known as the Lobby Committee.

Passed, under unanimous consent, S. Res. 74, directing the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate to order the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company to substitute manual telephone instruments for the recently installed dial telephones in the Senate wing of the Capitol and in the Senate Office Building.

Passed S. 3581 for the education, and relief of distress of Indians.

Passed S. 107 establishing additional land offices in certain Western States.

Passed S. 4242 fixing the salaries of the Commissioners of the District of Columbia at \$9,000 each.

Passed H. R. 7390 to authorize the appointment of an assistant commissioner of education in the Department of Interior.

Passed H. R. 7390 authorizing the appointment of an assistant to the chief of naval operations.

Passed H. R. 10175, for vocational rehabilitation of persons injured in industry.

Passed a number of bridge bills, road bills, and relief bills and other minor measures.

Passed H. R. 12013, to equalize Civil War pensions.

Passed H. R. 12205 granting pensions to veterans and widows of veterans of the Civil War and other wars.

Passed H. R. 2152 to expand the foreign field service of the Department of Agriculture, as a substitute for a similar bill already passed by the Senate.

Passed, with amendments, S. 4205, for the protection of the interests of railway employees in the event of consolidations.

Resumed consideration of H. R. 6, defining oleomargarine.

Adjourned.

House:

Sent to conference H. J. Res. 181, relative to discharged veterans' preferred rights of homestead entry. The Speaker appointed Representatives Colton, Utah, R., Smith, Idaho, R., and Mr. Evans, Mont., D., as conferees on the resolution.

On motion of Representative Underhill, Mass., R., the House arose to salute Mr. Arthur L. Clarke, Lord Mayor of Maldon, England, and Mrs. Clarke, who were seated in the gallery.

Agreed to Senate amendments to H. R. 26 for the development of George Washington Memorial Parkway from Mount Vernon and Fort Washington to Great Falls in the Potomac River.

Agreed to conference report on S. 15, the Civil Service retirement bill.

Passed H. Con. Res. for the appointment of a Congressional joint committee to attend the celebration in commemoration of the Lewis and Clark Expedition at Great Falls, Mont., July 4, 1930.

Debated and passed H. R. 10480, authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President to settle with the German Government the claims of the American Government for the Army of Occupation and the awards of the Mixed Claims Commission.

Debated and passed, by a vote of 210 to 18 H. Res. 220 for the appointment of a special committee of the House to investigate Communist propaganda in the United States.

Adjourned.

Friday, May 23, 1930

Senate:

Agreed to conference report on H. R. 7955, the War Department Appropriation Bill.

Refused, by a vote of 41 to 28, with 27 not voting, to reconsider the vote by which S. Res. 206, calling on the Secretary of Commerce for a report on aircraft accidents was passed.

Passed S. J. Res. 76, authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase farm loan bonds issued by Federal land banks.

Passed H. J. Res. 343 to supply a deficiency in appropriations for miscellaneous items for the House.

Resumed consideration of and debated H. R. 6, to change the definition of oleomargarine.

Adjourned until Monday, May 26.

House:

Passed H. J. Res. 343 to supply deficiency of appropriations for expenditures of the House.

Passed, under unanimous consent, H. R. 8479, so amending the Flood Control Act of 1928 as to apply an unexpended balance of funds to the relief of levee districts on the Mississippi River.

Passed a number of private bills on the private calendar.

Saturday, May 24, 1930

Senate:

The Senate was not in session.

House:

Received from the State Department a note from the Minister of Greece expressing his thanks to the House for its good wishes and congratulations on the hundredth anniversary of the independence of Greece.

Passed a number of bills on the private calendar.

Adjourned.

Monday, May 26, 1930

Senate:

Passed H. R. 10062 to authorize the attendance of the U. S. Marine Band at the National Encampment of the Grand Army of the Republic at Cincinnati during the week of August 24, 1930.

Passed S. Res. 276, approving in principal the "American Fair" to be held at Atlantic City, N. J., during July and August, 1930.

Passed S. Res. 278 requesting the Secretary of State to send to the Senate protests on file in the State Department against the tariff bill.

Passed S. Res. 275 requesting the Attorney General to report to the Senate the status of operations of packing companies under the Packers' Consent Decree of 1920, and the present attitude of the Department of Justice on that subject.

Agreed to conference report on S. 15, the Civil Service retirement bill.

Resumed consideration of H. R. 6, the oleomargarine bill. Debated and, by a vote of 44 to 32, with 20 not voting, passed the bill with amendments.

Sent to conference H. R. 11965, the legislative appropriation bill. The Presiding Officer (Mr. Fess in the chair) appointed Messrs. Jones, Wash., R., Smoot, Utah, R., Hale, Me., R., Broussard, La., D., and Copeland, N. Y., D., conferees on the bill.

Concurred in House amendments to Senate amendments to H. R. 7955, the War Department Appropriation bill.

Sent to conference H. R. 12013, the bill equalizing Civil War pensions. The Presiding Officer appointed Messrs. Robinson, Ind., R., Norbeck, S. D., R., and Wheeler, Mont., D., conferees on the bill.

Passed H. R. 11433, providing for the acquisition of land for the extension of the Library of Congress.

Discussed H. R. 9502, to amend the provisions of the Merchant Marine Act regarding mail carrying contracts.

Recessed.

House:

Sent to conference H. R. 12205, the Civil War veterans and widows of veterans pension bill. The Speaker appointed Representative Knutson, Minn., R., Kopp, Iowa, R., and Box, Tex., D., conferees on the bill.

Concurred, with an amendment, to the conference report on H. R. 7995, the War Department Appropriation bill.

Sent to conference H. R. 12013, the Civil War pension equalization bill. The Speaker appointed Representatives Nelson, Wis., R., Ellicott, Ind., R., and Lozier, Mo., D., conferees on the bill.

Sent to conference H. R. 10175, the vocational rehabilitation bill. The Speaker appointed Representatives Reed, N. Y., R., Fenn, Conn., R., and Black, N. Y., D., conferees on the bill.

Sent to conference H. R. 11965, the legislative appropriation bill. The Speaker appointed Representatives Murphy, Ohio, R., Welsh, Pa., R., Holday, Ill., R., Sandlin, and Cannon, Mo., D., conferees on the bill.

Representative Kvale, Minn., R., placed in the Record correspondence and reports relating to proposed licenses for the development of the Flathead, Mont., power site.

Passed several District of Columbia bills.

Adjourned.

Tuesday, May 27, 1930

Senate:

Sent to conference H. R. 10175, the vocational rehabilitation bill. The Vice President appointed Messrs. Metcalf, R. I., R., Couzens, Mich., R., and Walsh, Mass., D., conferees on the bill.

Passed H. R. 9804 the World War veterans compensation bill.

Passed H. J. Res. 328, authorizing the payment of certain war claims.

Discussed the conference report on the tariff bill.

Passed deficiency appropriation bills, covering the employees compensation fund; the expenses of Memorial Day celebrations and the expenses of the Marine Band at the Grand Army Encampment at Cincinnati.

Resumed consideration of H. R. 9592, to amend the provisions of the Merchant Marine Act relative to mail carrying contracts.

Adjourned.

House:

Passed several minor emergency appropriation bills.

Sent to conference H. J. Res. 270, authorizing appropriations to defray the expenses of Government delegates to the Sixth

Pan American Child Congress at Lima, Peru, in July, 1930. The Speaker appointed Representatives Temple, Pa., R., Fish, N. Y., R., and Linthicum, Md., D., conferees on the bill.

Began consideration of and debated S. J. Res. 49, as amended, for the operation of the Muscle Shoals farms and fertilizer projects.

Adjourned.

Wednesday, May 28, 1930

Senate:

Mr. Jones, Wash., R., made a statement correcting what he characterized as erroneous newspaper reports quoting him as saying he would urge a referendum on the Eighteenth Amendment and that if so directed by the voters of the State of Washington he would "Go Wet." Mr. Jones placed in the Record the press statement on the subject he issued on May 27.

Agreed to the conference report on H. R. 11965, the legislative appropriation bill.

Began consideration of and debated H. R. 12236, the Naval Appropriation bill.

Resumed consideration of the unfinished business, H. R. 9592, to amend the provisions of the Merchant Marine Act regarding payments for carrying the mails.

Received from the President, with an accompanying message, the veto of S. 476, the Spanish War Veterans' Pension Bill.

Adjourned.

House:

Resumed consideration of S. J. Res. 49, the Muscle Shoals resolution; adopted the substitute of the House Committee on Military Affairs and passed the resolution by a vote of 197 to 114, with 116 not voting.

Pursuant to H. Res. 220, passed on May 22, 1930, the Speaker appointed the following committee to investigate communist propaganda in the United States: Representatives Fish, N. Y., R., Nelson, Me., R., Bachman, W. Va., R., Driver, Ark., D., and Eslick, Tenn., D.

Adjourned.

Thursday, May 29, 1930

Senate:

Sent to conference S. J. Res. 49, the Muscle Shoals Resolution, as amended by the House. The Vice President appointed Messrs. McNary, Oreg., R., Norris, Nebr., R., and Smith, S. C., D., conferees on the resolution.

Passed H. R. 8479, amending the Flood Control Act of 1928.

Agreed to conference report on H. R. 12013, to equalize Civil War pensions.

Mr. Borah, Idaho, R., placed in the Record the text of the treaty signed at Washington May 26, 1930, between Great Britain and the United States regarding salmon fishing in the Fraser River system between the United States and Canada.

Agreed to conference report on H. R. 9806, for the construction of bridges over navigable streams in various sections of the United States.

Mr. Johnson, Calif., R., placed in the Record an article by Captain Dudley Knox, U. S. N., on the technical aspects of the London Naval Treaty.

Resumed consideration of the unfinished business, H. R. 9592, amending the Merchant Marine Act.

Recess until Monday, June 2.

House:

Debated and passed H. J. Res. 311, for the participation of the United States in an exposition to be held at Paris in 1931.

Debated and passed H. R. 10826, to amend the existing passport law so as to permit the holder of an American passport to renew it so that it will be valid for six years instead of two.

Sent to conference H. R. 12236, the Naval Appropriation Bill. The Speaker appointed Representatives French, Idaho, R., Hardy, Colo., R., Taber, N. Y., R., Ayres, Kans., D., and Oliver, Ala., D., conferees on the bill.

Passed several other bills on the Union Calendar.

Adjourned until Monday, June 2.

Monday, June 2, 1930

Senate:

Sent to conference H. R. 12236, the Navy appropriation bill. The Vice President appointed Messrs. Hale, Me., R., Phipps, Colo., R., Keyes, N. H., R., Glass, Va., D., and Swanson, Va., D., conferees on the bill.

Passed H. R. 9557 creating a corporation to be known as the Textile Foundation, whose governing board shall be the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Agriculture and three indi-

viduals to be appointed by the President of the United States. Passed S. 3054 to increase the salaries of certain postmasters of the first class.

Passed a number of private bills and minor public bills.

Passed H. J. Res. 251 creating a commission to study and consider amending the Constitution of the United States to provide that property may be taken by Congress for public use during war. The Commission is to be composed of four Members of the House, to be appointed by the Speakers of the House; four members of the Senate, to be appointed by the President of the Senate; the Secretaries of War, the Navy, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor and the Attorney General.

Passed S. Res. 256, authorizing the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to investigate and examine existing treaties with China and political and economic conditions that may effect American trade and commerce with China.

Passed H. R. 12302 granting pensions and increases of pensions to civil war veterans.

Passed S. 3409 to provide for the collection and publication by the Secretary of Agriculture of statistics on penants.

Passed S. 3594 authorizing the appropriation of \$13,200,000 for the next three years and \$4,000,000 per year thereafter, for the protection of the national forests from fire.

Passed H. J. Res. 282 authorizing the appointment of an envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the Union of South Africa.

Debated the veto message of the President on S. 476 the Spanish War Veterans Pension bill and passed the bill over the veto by a vote of 61 to 18 with 17 not voting.

Began consideration of the conference report on H. R. 2667, the tariff bill.

Executive session.

Recessed.

House:

Voted to seat Thomas L. Blanton, Tex. D., who was elected to fill the unexpired term of the late Representative R. O. Lee, from the Seventeenth Congressional District of Texas. The vote was 148 to 138 with 140 not voting.

A privileged resolution by Representative Clancy, Mich., R., H. Res. 233 providing for the appointment of a select committee of the House to investigate alleged criticisms of Members of the House by Representative Blanton, was referred to Committee on Elections No. 1.

Passed several bills on the Consent Calendar.

Passed S. 476, the Spanish War Veterans Pension Bill over the President's veto by a vote of 299 to 14 with 115 not voting. Adjourned.

Tuesday, June 3, 1930

Senate:

Resumed consideration of and defeated the conference report on H. R. 2667, the tariff bill.

Adopted the conference report on S. 3531 authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to enlarge tree planting operations in national forests.

Agreed to the conference report on S. 108, to regulate the marketing of perishable agricultural commodities.

Recessed.

House:

Agreed to the conference report on H. R. 12302, increasing certain civil war pensions.

Passed H. J. Res. 430 extended the time for the assessment, refund and credit of income taxes of 1927 and 1928.

Agreed to the conference report on S. 108 the perishable agricultural commodities bill.

Agreed to the conference report on S. 3531 to enlarge tree planting operations in national parks.

Passed, by a vote of 225 to 32, H. Res. 232, providing a rule for the consideration of several bills from the Committee on the Judiciary by a vote of 228 to 106 with 92 not voting.

Passed H. R. 12056 providing for waiver of trial by jury in Federal district courts.

Sent to Conference H. R. 6, to amend the definition of oleomargarine under the Pure Food Law. The Speaker appointed Messrs. Haugen, Iowa, R. Purnell, Ind., R., and Aswell, La. D., conferees on the bill.

Passed H. R. 9985, amending the Prohibition Act by further definition of "casual and slight" violations of the Act.

Considered H. R. 9937 providing for summary prosecutions of "casual and slight" violations of the Prohibition Act.

Adjourned.

Wednesday, June 4, 1930

Senate:

Resumed consideration of the conference report on the tariff bill.

Sent to conference S. 2370, increasing the salaries of the police force of the District of Columbia.

Recessed.

House:

Agreed to the conference report on H. R. 11965 the Legislative Appropriation bill.

Debated and passed by a vote of 218 to 117 with 93 not voting H. R. 9937, to provide for summary prosecution of slight or casual violations of the Prohibition Act.

Sent to conference S. J. Res. 49, the Muscle Shoals resolution. The Speaker appointed Representatives Ransley, Pa., R. Wurzbach, Tex., R. Reece, Tenn., R. Quin, Miss., D. and Fisher, Tenn., D., conferees on the bill.

Passed S. 3493 for the appointment of an additional circuit judge for the third judicial circuit.

Adjourned.

Thursday, June 5, 1930

Senate:

Agreed to the conference report on H. R. 10175, the vocational rehabilitation bill.

Passed a number of bills on the calendar.

Debated the conference report on the tariff bill and again sent the bill to conference.

Debated H. R. 9592 to amend the Merchant Marine Act.

Recessed.

House:

Passed a number of bills on the calendar.

Agreed to the Senate request for further conference on the tariff bill.

Adjourned.

Friday, June 6, 1930

Senate:

Passed S. 1133 to amend the Food and Drugs Act.

Began consideration of H. R. 10960, to amend the law relative to the citizenship and naturalization of married women.

Executive session.

Adjourned until Monday, June 9.

House:

Agreed to Senate amendments to H. R. 11143, creating a bureau of narcotics in the Treasury Department.

Approved H. Res. 241 from Committee on Elections 1 in the contested election of Mrs. Ruth Bryan Owen, Fla., D., declaring Mrs. Owen entitled to her seat in the House.

Agreed to the Conference report on H. R. 12236, the naval appropriation bill.

Agreed to the conference report on H. R. 12205, granting pensions to certain soldiers and sailors of the regular forces in the Civil War.

Passed a number of bills on the private calendar.

Adjourned until Monday, June 9.

Monday, June 9, 1930

Senate:

Agreed to conference report on H. J. Res. 270 authorizing an appropriation to defray the expenses of American delegates to the Sixth Pan American Child Congress at Lima, Peru, July, 1930.

Discussed conference report on the tariff bill.

Executive session.

Recessed.

House:

Passed H. R. 11852, amending the law governing copyright registration of designs.

Passed H. R. 3394 to provide for the deportation of aliens convicted under the narcotic law.

Passed, under suspension of the rules, S. 3619, to reorganize the Federal Power Commission.

Passed a number of bills on the Consent Calendar.

Adjourned.

Tuesday, June 10, 1930

Senate:

Sent to conference S. 3619, to reorganize the Federal Power Commission. The Presiding Officer, (Mr. Fess in the chair) appointed Messrs. Couzens, Mich., R., Watson, Ind., R., and Pittman, Nev., D.

Concurred in House amendments to S. 3950, authorizing the establishment of a migratory bird refuge in Kansas.

Discussed the conference report on the tariff bill.

Agreed, by unanimous consent, to take a final vote on the tariff bill, H. R. 2667, on Friday, June 13.

Executive session.
Recessed.

House:

Agreed to the conference report on the Senate resolution authorizing American participation in the Pan American Child Congress.

Passed a number of bills on the Consent Calendar.
Adjourned.

Wednesday, June 11, 1930

Senate:

Passed H. R. 8372 authorizing the appropriation of \$6,500,000 for the purchase of the necessary land and the construction of an annex to the Library of Congress.

Passed a number of claims bill, bridge bills and private bills.

Passed H. R. 9110, for the grading and classifying of clerks in the foreign service of the United States.

Passed S. 3416, repealing various provisions of the espionage laws.

Passed, with Senate amendment, H. R. 730, regulating the interstate traffic in canned goods.

Recessed.

House:

Passed a number of bills on the calendar.

Passed S. 174 to provide for the establishment, in one of the Southeastern States, of a branch home of the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers.

Adjourned.

Thursday, June 12, 1930

Senate:

Concurred in House amendments to a number of bills.

Concurred in the conference report on the tariff bill.

Executive session.
Recessed.

House:

Passed a number of bills under unanimous consent.

Debated S. 962 to amend the transportation act to enable the Merchants and Miners Steamship Company to sue in the Court of Claims for approximately \$800,000 claimed to be due from the Government while that company was under war time Government control and voted to strike out the enacting clause and send bill back to committee, thus defeating the bill.

Adjourned.

Friday, June 13, 1930

Senate:

Debated the conference reports on the tariff bill, H. R. 2667. The reports were finally adopted by a vote of 33 to 42, 10 not voting.

Agreed to a number of conference reports.

Adjourned until Monday, June 16.

House:

Passed H. Res. 191 for the appointment of a special committee of five members of the House who are members of the Committee on the Judiciary to inquire into the official conduct of Harry B. Anderson, United States District Judge for the Western district of Tennessee.

Passed a number of bills on the private calendar.

Adjourned.

Saturday, June 14, 1930

Senate:

The Senate was not in session.

House:

Debated and concurred in the conference reports on the tariff bill by a vote of 222 to 153, with 52 not voting.

Adjourned.

British Statesmen Debate Naval Treaty

Continued from page 180

Pro

HON. RAMSAY MACDONALD—Continued

there is no use minimizing it. The Conference had done some very good preparatory work, very essential preparatory work, and anyone knows this who sat through those months. We have to start again the conversations with Italy and France. The Preparatory Commission at Geneva must go on. We have to face the land problem, and the air problem. We have to coordinate them altogether in a well-thought-out and well-balanced scheme of security, of actual reduction. The greatest obstacle of all is that of the mentality of people who, while they know perfectly well that they will never get security by military power, nevertheless, as soon as you bring up their experts and their representatives to face actual proposals of programmes of reduction, you find quivering and shaking and being unwilling, while candidly admitting that they are taking the risk of war, to take the risks of peace for once, to see if that will not be more successful than the other. That has been our work, imperfect, unfinished, but nevertheless done in the very best of good will and with the steadfast determination, and ended for the time being, or rather postponed.—*Ex. See 9, p. 192.*

Con

HON. WINSTON CHURCHILL—Continued

then we shall have definitely become the second naval Power.

Since the war the relations of Great Britain and the United States have become to a very large extent the politics of the world. We in Great Britain can clearly see the course which we should take. We ought to strive to unite the British Empire or British Commonwealth of Nations as closely as possible into one effective whole, so that we can co-operate with the other great branch of the English-speaking peoples on equal terms and as equal partners in high endeavor and equal guardians of peace and progress among all nations.

But equality is the foundation of that co-operation. There is the path of safety and honor for all. It is now to be impeded most gravely by action which, though well intentioned, is wrongly conceived and improvidently executed, and I urge that a far more stringent examination of this issue should be made by Parliament before we commit ourselves to what is certainly a lamentable and may well be an irrevocable decision.—*Ex. See 9, p. 192.*

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

The White House Calendar

April 18 to June 13

President Hoover's Veto Message on the Spanish War Veterans' Bill, May 28, 1930.



AM returning this bill (S. 476) without approval. The bill establishes a new basis for pension of Spanish War Veterans. I am in favor of proper discharge of the national obligation to men who have served in war who have become disabled and are in need. But certain principles are included in this legislation which I deem are opposed to the interest both of war veterans and of the public. My major objections to this bill are these:

Vicious Habit Disabilities

1. In the whole of our pension legislation over past years we have excluded from such national award persons whose disabilities arise from "vicious habits." This bill breaks down that exclusion and opens the door for claims of disability incurred at any time in the life of the pensioner arising from venereal diseases, alcoholism, drug habits, etc. Certainly such claims for public help cannot be fairly based upon sacrifice to the nation in war and must be opposed to national policy.

Minimum Service Provisions

2. This legislation lowers the minimum service period from 90 days to 70 days for non-service connected disability pension. Under other provisions of law, men who served only one day and during that day suffered injury or impaired health, became eligible for pensions. This

law, however, provides that if a man should incur any disability at any time in his life he may claim pension with only 70 days of service. The ninety day minimum service has been maintained against the Civil War veterans all these years because less service than this was not considered to imply personal danger or risk which warranted pension. If injury or impaired health incident to service is clearly proven, other laws cover such cases.

The Selfish Cases

3. It seems to me that in the interest of justice to the taxpayer and to maintain the fine body of citizens comprised in our war veterans free from the stigma of encroachment upon the public treasury, there should be a requirement of "need" as well as disability as a basis for these pensions. It is to me the height of injustice that citizens who are less well placed should be called upon to support from taxes those whose station in life enables them to support themselves or to live in independent security. The whole spirit of the pension system is that of a grateful nation rising to the support of those who have served in war, were injured or who have met with legitimate difficulties in after life which impose privation upon them. While many veterans may refuse to accept such pensions when they can get along otherwise, yet the cases of selfishness are bound to cause a constant irritation of feeling against a pension system that permits these unmerited and unnecessary payments.

Proclamations

April 26—A proclamation putting into effect a treaty of commerce and navigation between the United States and the Turkish Republic.

May 28—A proclamation designating April 14 as Pan-American Day.

June 6—A Proclamation of a convention on the status of aliens in the American States.

June 6—A proclamation of a convention on the rights and duties of American States in the event of civil strife.

Nominations

April 22—Frederick Huff Payne, of Massachusetts, to be Assistant Secretary of War.

April 24—Antonio M. Perry, of Hawaii, to be Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Hawaii.

April 24—James J. Banks, of Hawaii, to be Associate Justice, Supreme Court of Hawaii.

April 24—James Wesley Thompson, of Hawaii, to be Circuit Judge, Third Circuit, Hawaii.

April 24—Homer L. Ross, of Hawaii, to be Circuit Judge, Fourth Circuit, Hawaii.

April 24—Robert P. Patterson, of New York, to be United States District Judge, Southern District, New York.

April 24—William Lee Brand of Virginia, to be United States Marshal, Western District, New York.

April 30—William Dawson, of Minnesota, to be Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Ecuador.

April 30—Robert B. Morris, of Texas, to be Collector of Customs at Galveston, Tex.

May 1—Jeannette A. Hyde, of Utah, to be Collector of Customs at Honolulu, Hawaii.

May 1—John P. Hallanan, of West Virginia, to be United States Marshal, Southern District of West Virginia.

May 8—Edward F. Feely, of the District of Columbia, to be Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Bolivia.

May 8—Harry H. Atkinson, of Nevada, to be United States Attorney, District of Nevada.

May 8—Frederick C. Schneider, of New Jersey, to be United States Marshal, District of New Jersey.

May 9—Owen J. Roberts of Pennsylvania to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.

May 14—Alfred A. Wheat, of New York, to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

May 23—Richard S. Whaley, of South Carolina, to be a Judge of the United States Court of Claims.

May 23—Raymond U. Smith, of New Hampshire, to be United States Attorney, District of New Hampshire.

May 23—Olaf Eldem of South Dakota, to be United States Attorney, District of South Dakota.

May 23—George L. Mallory, of Arkansas, to be United States Marshal, Eastern District of Arkansas.

May 23—Albert C. Sittel, of California, to be United States Marshal, Southern District of California.

May 23—Frank T. Newton, of Michigan, to be United States Marshal, Eastern District of Michigan.

May 23—Chester N. Leedom, of South Dakota, to be United States Marshal, District of South Dakota.

May 26—Hanford MacNider, of Iowa, to be Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Canada.

May 29—William R. Castle, Jr., of the District of Columbia, to be Assistant Secretary of State.

May 29—Joseph L. Crupper, of Virginia, to be Collector of Customs at Norfolk, Va.

June 5—Wallace Townsend, of Arkansas, to be United States Attorney, Eastern District of Arkansas.

June 5—Charles E. Allen, of Washington, to be United States Marshal, Western District of Washington.

June 6—Jesse C. Adkins, of the District of Columbia, to be an Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

June 6—Louis H. Breuer, of Missouri, to be United States Attorney, Eastern District of Missouri.

June 6—Jacob H. Fulmer, of Nevada, to be United States Marshal, District of Nevada.

June 6—Edward C. Plummer, of Maine, to be a Member of the United States Shipping Board for a term of six years.

June 9—David E. Kaufman, of Pennsylvania, to be Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Siam.

June 9—Thomas E. Campbell, of Arizona, to be a Member of the United States Civil Service Commission.

June 10—Edward T. Franks, of Kentucky, to be a Member of the Federal Board for Vocational Education for a term of three years.

June 11—Louis H. Crawford, of Georgia, to be United States Marshal, Northern District of Georgia.

June 12—W. Cameron Forbes, of Massachusetts, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Japan.

June 12—Alexander Legge, of Illinois, and Charles C. Teague, of California, to be Members of the Federal Farm Board.

June 12—Jennie P. Musser, of Utah, to be Collector of Customs at Salt Lake City, Utah.

June 13—Ralph J. Totten, of Tennessee, to be Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Union of South Africa.

June 13—Henry E. Davis, of South Carolina, to be United States Attorney, Eastern District of South Carolina.

The London Naval Treaty Explained

Continued from page 165

The total tonnage in all classes of auxiliary craft laid down by the United States during the years 1922 to 1930, inclusive, was 138,120. During that time Great Britain laid down 203,725 tons, Japan 242,771 tons, France 249,454 tons, and Italy 163,943 tons. It is apparent that in those years the United States had a much smaller building program than any of the other four powers.

Our war tonnage is now becoming obsolescent and we are faced with the necessity of rebuilding much of the Navy. The treaty enables us to proceed with the task in an orderly manner and at a lower total tonnage than we have had in the past, in spite of the fact that we have built less than any other country represented at the conference.—*Extracts, See 1, p. 192.*

The Controversy Between France and Italy.

Continued from page 166

with some such grandiloquent and striking gesture as the concordat with the Vatican. At any rate it has become easier for him to be moderate now that he has proved to his Fascist supporters that at London he was willing to risk wrecking the conference rather than yield on issues of prestige.

French Security in the Mediterranean

The third political problem at London may be placed under the name of French security. France came to the conference pledged to reduce her naval program if her security were increased and wanted that security in the form of a Mediterranean Pact. The British declined the pact in the Mediterranean. "Very well," said the French, "next best is that you can find just what you are pledged to do under the ambiguous covenant of the League of Nations, for if we know you will help us in a general crisis, that means help in the Mediterranean."

The British finally made a promise, a slight one on paper, but an important one in effect. They promised that in a threat of war after the peace machinery of the League had failed, if the League Council should make a recommendation, the British Government would be bound by that recommendation. Since a recommendation of the Council requires the unanimous vote and Britain is a

member of the Council, this means that the British merely promise to act as they had voted. But for France it was a valuable concession. It means that automatic sanctions would be applied by the League if the peace machinery of the Covenant broke down. For this France was willing to make a certain adjustment of naval tonnage. For this plus Italy's acceptance of the existing ratio of naval strength, France would have reduced still further, and there would have been no escape clause in the treaty.

When it became clear at London that France and Italy were not going to limit their navies, the British withdrew their offer, but if France and Italy should reach a political agreement, the offer will undoubtedly be revived so that the Naval Treaty can be completed. Then, for the first time the five great navies of the world would be limited in all categories. But, as the British made their offer to clarify the covenant only after the American delegation had spoken of our willingness to enter a general consultative pact, this subject, too, may be revived, for the British can never promise to lend their navy for a League blockade in cases where this might lead to a clash with America.

When you hear that disarmament is only possible if political preparation is made for it, such problems as these are what is meant.—*Extracts, See 2, p. 192.*

Sources from Which Material in This Number Is Taken

Articles for which no source is given have been specially prepared for this number of THE CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST

1—Radio Address to the United States from London, April 20, 1930.	5—Hearings of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, May 14-29, 1930.
2—Radio Address from London over Columbia Broadcasting System. (World Peace Foundation Radio Readings.)	6—Hearings of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 12-28, 1930.
3—Radio Address, Washington, June 12, Columbia Broadcasting System.	7—Radio Address, Washington, June 19, 1930.
4—Radio Address, Washington, June 18, Columbia Broadcasting System.	8—Congressional Record, May 29, 1930.
	9—Official Report, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, May 15, 1930.

Coming Numbers of The Congressional Digest.

Chain Store Number:

The September, 1930, number of the DIGEST will be devoted to a complete analysis of the widely discussed Chain Store problem. Chronological review of the growth of Chain Stores. The Federal Government and the Chain Store problem. Bills pending in Congress affecting Chain Stores. Pro and Con discussion of the problem.

Campaign Number:

The October, 1930, number of the DIGEST will be devoted to the Congressional campaign of 1930. The full membership of the House and one-third of the Membership of the Senate will be elected in 1930. How the election of Representatives and Senators is conducted. The record of the Seventy-first Congress to date from party standpoints. The principal issues of the campaign.

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